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The Realism of Hans Morgenthau 
 
Brian A. Keaney 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the life and career of Hans J. Morgenthau, commonly 
accepted as the father of the realist paradigm within the field of international relations. It 
does so by offering a dynamic revisionist account of the nature of Morgenthau’s classical 
realism and suggests how the approach discussed might have wider application in the 
field of international relations. Traditional perspectives of Morgenthau suggest that in the 
course of his career, he changed from holding what would generally be labeled a 
conservative political viewpoint to a liberal political viewpoint. This thesis takes a 
different starting point. It does so by suggesting that constancy, not change, was the 
hallmark of Morgenthau’s intellectual development. Thus, what appeared to be a shift 
from right to left, was in fact merely the different applications of a consistent reading of 
international relations.  
Central to this interpretation of Morgenthau’s work is the second innovative 
argument of this thesis: that Morgenthau’s realism contained within it the potential for 
both conservative (as traditionally defined) and progressive (as traditionally defined) 
applications. Acknowledging that realism as conservatism is already an accepted 
understanding within the field of international relations, this thesis focuses on drawing 
out the progressive potential of Morgenthau’s realism, by proving that what appeared in 
Morgenthau’s later career to be an intellectual shift in fact stemmed from the 
progressivism inherent in the actual existing realism of Morgenthau’s early career applied 
to new situations met in his later career 
Based on this analysis of what has been accomplished within the framework of 
classical realism by Morgenthau, it is the challenge of this thesis to invite contemporary 
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realist thinkers to do the same. In short, the thesis invites contemporary theorists to 
explore, recover and reclaim the liberatory and progressive potential of classical realism. 
In so doing, the thesis suggests the potential for two new research programs. First, 
reclaiming the liberatory potential of Morgenthau’s approach and use of  realism provides 
for the creation of a new understanding of contemporary realism which can transcend 
both the essentially sterile internal debates between classical and neo-realism and those 
between classical realism, neo-realism and neo-classical realism. Second, foregrounding 
the liberatory possibilities of classical realism offers a fruitful approach for the recreation 
of common ground between realism and other more ‘politically progressive’ paradigms 
in contemporary international relations theory such as peace research or constructivism. It 
is the final hope for this thesis that it might, by building bridges within and between 
different fields, lay the foundations of a possible path for the reintegration of the whole 
discipline of international relations.   
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Introduction: 
Defining Realism 
 
Over the course of the past half-century, realism, or the attempt to understand the 
behavior of states based on the recognition that “international politics, like all politics, is 
a struggle for power,” has been one of the central paradigms in United States 
International Relations theory.1  The concept of realism or realpolitik can be dated back 
to Thucydides and Ancient Greece or perhaps Cardinal Richelieu of the French Ancien 
Regime.2 It is, however, more commonly associated with Otto Von Bismarck, the first 
Chancellor of Germany and his efforts to create a nuanced counter-balancing between the 
great European powers so as to avoid a general war in the later half of the nineteenth 
century.3 In the United States it is yet more commonly associated with the work of Hans 
J. Morgenthau, who both as a professor at the University of Chicago, and as the author of 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, the seminal textbook of 
realist theory, articulated what came to be accepted as the foundations of a realist 
understanding of the post-war Cold War world.  
If Morgenthau articulated and defended realism for over thirty years from within 
the academy, it was policy makers in Washington who attempted to apply its theories to 
the reality of international relations. Represented in such key policies as containment - 
the conviction on the part of U.S. policy makers that they should try and ‘contain’ the 
power and influence of the Soviet Union - realism came to be as central to the post-1945 
                                                 
1  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948),    
2 Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans.  Rex Warner 
(Harmonsworth: Penguin Classics, 1954) cited in John A. Vasquez, Classics of International Relations, 3rd 
Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996). Cardinal Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu, The Political 
Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, trans. Henry Bertram Hill, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1964). 
3 A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and Statesman, (New York: Knopf, 1955); David Blackbourn, A 
History of Germany 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
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foreign policy of the United States as it was to the field of international relations.4 
Although the practical application of containment was first laid out in George F. 
Kennan's famous Long Telegram, made public in 1947 in his anonymous Foreign Affairs 
article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," better known as Article X, it was Hans 
Morgenthau who provided the intellectual basis for the policy.5 The readiness of United 
States policymakers to embrace both the theory and practice of realism may be traced in 
part to the tremendous influence exerted by Morgenthau over the future U.S. 
policymaking elite. Indeed, it would not be too much to suggest that for many U.S. 
diplomats, politicians and civil servants, Morgenthau’s realism was the framework 
through which they understood their world. 
 As significant as the theory of realism has proven to be to the practice of politics, 
however, its importance within International Relations theory has declined. As Francis A. 
Beer and Robert Hariman have pointed out, “realists believe that realism is the only story 
of world politics. Post-realists assert that realism is only one story among many: although 
it is an important story, it provides neither the only plausible explanation nor the only 
possible world.”6 In a similar vein, theorists such as Alexander Wendt have argued that 
contrary to realism’s focus upon power and material power structures, it is ideas and 
culture that govern relations between states.7 
This thesis takes a different starting point. As it does so, it offers three major 
conclusions. First, through an analysis of the published writings of Hans Morgenthau 
over the course of his forty-year career, the thesis suggests that Morgenthau, despite 
appearances to the contrary remained consistent in his thought and analyses. Simply put, 
Morgenthau, in the course of his career, appeared to shift from what would generally be 
labeled a conservative political viewpoint to a liberal political viewpoint. In 1948, he laid 
out the basis for what would become the containment of communism in Eastern Europe 
by advocating an aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union; in 1968, he argued for the 
acceptance of communism in South East Asia by advocating the withdrawal of U.S. 
                                                 
4 Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics Reading. MA: Addison Wesley, 1979. 
5 George F. Kennan  "The Sources of Soviet conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 566-82 
6 Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, “Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations,” in Francis A. 
Beer and Robert Hariman ed., Post Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1996), 7. 
7 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
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troops. Despite the apparent shift in thought suggested by these different policies, 
however, it is the thesis of this paper that they in fact represent two sides of the same 
intellectual understanding of international relations, two sides of realism.  
The second conclusion offered by the thesis is contained within the first: that 
realism contains within it the potential for both conservative and progressive analyses, 
and that the likelihood of one or the other being suggested at any given time or in any 
given situation depends on the particulars of the time and situation. Thus, contrary to 
traditional understandings of realism as a purely conservative doctrine, this thesis 
demonstrates that realism contains within in it a progressive, liberatory and even moral 
component. It is this component which will provide the mechanism by which 
Morgenthau will appear to shift from conservative to liberal. The conservative 
component of realism has long been recognized. It is the aim of this thesis to break new 
ground by highlighting the progressive component – not as a sign of Morgenthau’s 
change of heart but as a sign of the progressivism inherent within realism.  
Third, the thesis suggests that accepting the legitimacy of these understandings of 
Morgenthau changes the manner in which Morgenthau’s work should be read, and 
thereby changes both our understanding of what realism really is or was meant to be, and 
our understanding of the consequences of the implementation of realist theory by so 
many practical disciples in the years since 1945.  
 In order to understand both the subtleties of Morgenthau’s original concepts of 
realism along with the significance of his evolving applications, it is best to begin with an 
analysis of what might best be termed ‘basic’ realist theory. As proposed by Morgenthau 
in the first edition of Politics Among Nations, published in 1948, realism may be said to 
be based on a number of key assumptions. Firstly, that the state is the central actor on the 
world stage. Thus for Morgenthau, the implication is that international organizations and 
other non-governmental formations, whether commercial enterprises or co-coordinated 
networks of individuals of like mind, are either essentially reflective of the interests of 
established sovereign states, and thus would be covered under the general rubric of his 
classical realism, or are simply not relevant in terms of his paradigm. Secondly, that the 
natural state of international politics is that of anarchy - anarchy not in the sense of a war 
of all against all but anarchy in the sense that there is no legal authority to bind a state 
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when it perceives that breaking any agreement with other states is in its interests. 
Morgenthau did not suggest that the international legal order of conventions, treaties, 
agreements, understandings and common shared practices of states have no effect but 
rather that their effect is contingent upon the value placed upon them by the states which 
observe them. Thirdly, that all states will seek to have the greatest amount of power that 
they possibly can. Fourth, that it is the intrinsic nature of the human actors who control 
the states that causes states to behave as they do. Fifth, that in their pursuit of security or 
power, states will conduct politics and adopt policies according to a rational framework. 
Sixth, that force, or the ability and willingness to use force when perceived to be 
necessary, is an integral part of statehood. 
 Building on Morgenthau’s work, Kenneth Walz later adapted realist theory to 
incorporate the notion that it was the international structure, not the deliberate willed 
actions of men and women, which influenced states’ behavior. According to Walz it is 
the structure of the international system itself that determines the behavior of states.8 In 
the years since, Walz’ neo-realism, or structural realism, has of course been further 
refined by other scholars. Indeed, contemporary realist theory or neo-classical realism 
now contains within it a number of critical debates. There is, for example, the debate 
between offensive and defensive realists. Offensive realists hold the view that the 
constant ebb and flow of security and power between states guarantees that the 
international system will be dominated by opportunistic states forever fearfully looking 
over their shoulders at potential and actual competitors. According to this offensive 
interpretation, states must continuously seek to strengthen themselves and their position 
vis-à-vis other states, even in the absence of a directly perceived threat. As a result, the 
behavior and desire of states are mainly shaped by a perception of the relative capability 
of other states. Thus the unknowable future and risk of threat are characteristics of the 
offensive realist.9  
By contrast, defensive realists hold the view that real security is available, and 
that the best way for a state to achieve it is to forgo overtly offensive postures. In other 
words, because of the anarchical nature of the international environment, the security of 
                                                 
8 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
9 For an explication of offensive realism see, John J. Mearsheimer The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
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the nation is not always best achieved through a maximization of the nation’s power vis-
à-vis other nations.10 According to this defensive interpretation, the international system 
creates positive incentives for behavior that does not threaten the wellbeing of other 
states and which thereby preserves the stability of the international system. Unlike 
offensive realism which posits a direct relationship between the international system and 
the policy choices that states make, defensive realism sees the matter as being more 
complex, in that the relationship between the nature of the ‘international’ and the 
behavior of states is frequently of an indirect nature. While it is possible to present this 
conflict within realism in other terms – as a debate between hawkish and dovish realists, 
or between optimistic and pessimistic realists – the offensive/defensive characterization 
seems best able to capture the two sets of counter positions.  
The vitality of the debates outlined above suggests that realism is a sufficiently 
thriving force in International Relations practice for theorists to want to figure it out. This 
thesis represents a contribution to that debate. Specifically, it seeks to reclaim the 
liberatory potential of classical realism and in so doing suggests as one of the 
implications of that reclamation, a new research program which may bring about the 
possibility of real and systematic integration and melding between realism and other 
paradigms in the field such as constructivism and democratic peace theory. Not alone 
then does this thesis seek to reclaim Morgenthau’s own interpretation and application of 
realism in a liberatory direction, but it also offers a path toward a new general theory of 
international relations for the twenty-first century; a theory which may finally resolve the 
decades’ old tensions between realist and idealistic or normative approaches to the field.  
The thesis will begin by examining in Chapter Two Morgenthau’s life, bringing 
out the influences of his youth which appear to have affected his later years, but focusing 
on his adult life and his formation and articulation of realism. The thesis will pay 
particular attention to Morgenthau’s protestations against United States’ policy in 
Vietnam, illustrating how what has traditionally been perceived as a liberal expression of 
protest more clearly fits within an enhanced understanding of realism. Indeed, the 
                                                 
10 Key defensive realist works include Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987) and Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Snyder, Myths of 
Empire; William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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argument that the issues involved in Morgenthau’s appraisal of Vietnam illustrates more 
clearly than anything else the combination of flexibility and constancy that was inherent 
within Morgenthau’s understanding of realism is a thread which will run throughout the 
thesis. 
Chapter Three looks at the various editions of Politics Among Nations, drawing 
out the core paradigm of realism while also illustrating how Morgenthau adapted each 
edition to suit changing times. Chapter Four and Five consider selections of 
Morgenthau’s other published works, again using them to show the consistency with 
which Morgenthau approached the issue of international relations. Chapter Six focuses on 
Morgenthau’s published reviews of the work of other scholars. More than some 
academics, Morgenthau used the opportunity created by these reviews to articulate his 
own views, judging a book largely by whether it fitted within his framework or not, 
whether it offered a helpful lens through which to view the field and practice of 
international relations. Finally, Chapter Seven, the conclusion, places Morgenthau’s 
achievements in a larger context, offering suggestions for future research. Before we can 
appreciate the significance of Morgenthau the scholar, however, we need to learn 
something of Morgenthau the man. It is to that task that we now turn.  
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Chapter One: 
Morgenthau: From Realist to Realist 
 
Hans Joachim Morgenthau was born on 17 February 1904 in Coburg in North 
East Germany. As the seat of local government at the height of the German Empire under 
William II, Coburg represented the heart of German conservatism.11 This political 
environment clearly suited the Morgenthau family who, in recognition of their perception 
of themselves as loyal subjects of the German state named their only child after the 
youngest son of the Kaiser, Prince Joachim of Prussia; commissioned a portrait 
photograph of the young Morgenthau dressed in the uniform of a Prussian Dragoon;12 
and mixed in sufficiently rarified circles to be invited to the court receptions of the 
Duchess of Bavaria.13 Befitting his membership in this social class, Morgenthau attended 
an elite secondary school – the  Humanistisches Gymnasium – where as Morgenthau 
described his fellow pupils “there was not a worker’s child among them.”14 Morgenthau’s 
perception of himself during his school career was as a loyal German enthusiastic for the 
success of the empire in the Great War.15 Despite being the only Jewish pupil in his class 
Morgenthau perceived himself to be a loyal and integrated German subject. At this point 
in his life, Morgenthau already had some sense of what would later become his career; 
rejecting the idea of becoming “a run-of-the-mill lawyer or teacher,” and hoping instead 
to become “a writer, perhaps a professor, maybe even a poet.”16 In any case, receiving the 
Abitur with high awards in spring 1923, Morgenthau seemed destined to follow in the 
footsteps of his father into a position of respect in the Weimar middle class.  
                                                 
11 Hans J. Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932,” Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Jan/Feb, 
1978), 63-69.  
12 This charming picture was published in Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 63. 
13  Christopher  Frei., Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2001), 13. 
14  Frei.. Hans J. Morgenthau, 13.  Morgenthau, Johnson interview, quoted in Frie, p.15.  
15  Frei.. Hans J. Morgenthau, 15.  Morgenthau recorded this view in a school composition written in 
March, 1918.  
16  Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 63. 
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 Morgenthau entered the University of Frankfurt am Main intending to study 
philosophy.17 Unhappy with his experience of philosophy as taught there, however, he 
switched to law in the autumn of 1923 at the University of Munich. Still determined to 
study philosophy, however, Morgenthau complemented his law studies by taking 
additional courses in his areas of interest. Specifically, he studied with art historian 
Heinrich Wolfflin, and the nineteenth-century historian Hermann Oncken. It was the 
latter who introduced Morgenthau to Bismarck’s foreign policy, and more generally, to 
the relationship between foreign and military politics. Oncken’s work had a “profound 
impression” upon Morgenthau. As he phrased it, “For the first time I felt the impact of a 
coherent system of thought, primarily a distillation of Bismarck’s realpolitik that 
appeared to support my isolated and impressionistic judgments on contemporary issues of 
foreign policy”18 These “isolated and impressionistic judgments” albeit further 
developed, and perhaps better articulated, would form the basis of much of Morgenthau’s 
subsequent writings, appearing as a consistent train of thought throughout his 
publications. Some sense of the debt Morgenthau perceived himself to owe to Oncken 
may be seen by his always pausing in front of the photograph of Oncken that hung in the 
History Department at the University of Chicago.19  
A third influence on Morgenthau’s intellectual formation at Munich was the 
Professor of Constitutional and Church Law, Heinrich Rothenbucher. Rothenbucher 
impressed Morgenthau not only on account of his work - the political and social 
philosophy of Max Weber - but because he was “a man of exemplary and, in the 
contemporary German context, extraordinary civil courage.” Morgenthau perceived a 
similarity between the subject of the seminar, Weber, and the teacher, Rothenbucher, as 
both men approached political problems with “detachment, objectivity, and penetrating 
intelligence.”20 In light of Morgenthau’s expressed admiration for both the men and the 
character of their intellectual endeavors, it is perhaps hardly surprising that he appears to 
have modeled his own subsequent role as a scholar upon them. Thus, whilst the political 
                                                 
17  Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 63. 
18 Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 64. 
19  Kenneth W. Thompson, “The Writing of Politics Among Nations: Its Sources and its Origins,” 
International Studies: Notes of the International Studies Association Special Issue: The Legacy of Hans 
Morgenthau, Vol. 24, No. 1, (1999). Oncken had been a visiting professor at Chicago in 1905, a 
prefiguration of Morgenthau’s own later trajectory. 
20 Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 64. 
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turmoil in America caused by the Vietnam War was hardly akin to that caused by the rise 
of the Nazis, and while a number of intensive tax audits hardly compared with 
persecution by the Gestapo, still in his own work, Morgenthau held by his convictions, 
refusing to concede when it might have made him more popular with the authorities to 
have done so. 
Morgenthau graduated from Munich in February 1927 and immediately began 
training as a lawyer. The professional part of his training consisted of a series of 
placements with various government departments. His main work focused on drafting 
briefs on points of criminal and labor law. Whilst Morgenthau found this work to be 
sometimes fascinating as an intellectual exercise, he perceived the questions with which 
it dealt to be “marginal to the crucial issues with which society had to come to terms.” 
According to Morgenthau what really mattered in contemporary Germany “was not the 
merits of different legal interpretations but the distribution of political power.”21 In the 
context of Weimar Germany, a democratic government facing threats from all sides, 
Morgenthau’s analysis certainly makes sense and helps explain perhaps his later 
perception that power and the nature of its distribution were the core issues within 
society.  
As he trained, Morgenthau commenced work on his doctorate at the University of 
Frankfurt which he completed in 1929 with a thesis entitled “The International Judicial 
Function and the Concept of Politics.” Morgenthau had first become interested in the 
topic of international law under the tutelage of Professor Karl Neumeyer at the University 
of Munich. Building on his work with Neumeyer, which had led him to the conclusion 
that international law was “a particularly weak kind of law,” Morgenthau in his thesis 
suggested that its weakness stemmed from “the intrusion of international politics.” 
Taking this discovery “one step further” prompted Morgenthau to issue what would come 
to be the essence of his later work: “what really mattered in relations between nations 
was not international law but international politics.”22 Thus we see that the constancy that 
would later come to be a hallmark of Morgenthau’s realist thought after Politics Among 
Nations, was in fact already a part of his intellectual framework twenty years before. His 
                                                 
21 Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 65. 
22 Morgenthau, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 65. 
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experience in the German law courts, his experience in the archives, and his experience 
living in Weimar Germany, convinced him of the twin propositions that what mattered in 
any society was power, and the nature of its distribution, and that what mattered in 
international relations was politics not law, or as he would later phrase it, the politics of 
power as it was actually was, not the aspirations of how things should be.  
Morgenthau’s last legal position, toward the end of 1931, was that of Acting 
President of the Labor Law Court in Frankfurt. He found the experience dissatisfying, 
however, and returned to his earlier focus upon an academic career. To achieve this he 
needed to complete his habilitation, an advanced doctorate. With no openings available in 
his own university Morgenthau took leave from his judicial function in February 1932 
and went to Geneva to enroll in the Graduate Institute for International Studies, taking a 
position as an instructor in German public law at the University of Geneva. His time in 
Switzerland was not overly happy, however, as he grappled with anti-Semitic students, 
fought with his colleagues, was unable to teach as much as he would have liked, and 
found himself in sufficient financial peril that he had to supplement his university stipend 
with some journalism. Perhaps in part as a result of these difficulties, Morgenthau 
initially failed his habilitation, although he did, after much effort, eventually get this 
decision reversed. Unfortunately, however, even if he had wanted to return to his post as 
a judge, from which he had been on leave-of-absence since 1931, it would have been 
impossible for at this point the national history of Germany caught up with Morgenthau 
and as a result of the Nazi “Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil Service,” 
Morgenthau was purged on 17 November 1933 from his position with the Frankfurt 
Labor Court.23 
The next four years were cumulatively quite difficult for Morgenthau, being 
marked by his attempts to secure employment, of a kind he found amenable, wherever he 
could – quite a difficult task for a Jewish refugee in the 1930s. Morgenthau was initially 
fortunate, however, that two years later, when his time in Switzerland came to an end, 
and he was unable to return to Germany, he received assistance from the Emergency 
Committee for German Scholars Abroad which arranged for him, in 1935, to go to Spain.  
There he joined the faculty of the newly-created Institute of International and Economic 
                                                 
23 Frie, Hans J. Morgenthau, 49. 
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Studies as a professor of international law. Whilst in Spain Morgenthau married Irma 
Thormann (with whom he subsequently had two children) and took his first steps as a 
public intellectual by writing for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the major Swiss daily 
newspaper-of-record.24 The paper was renowned both for its extensive coverage of 
economic and business matters and for its intellectual and in-depth articles and was, and 
still is, politically close to the liberal Free Democratic Party of Switzerland.  
Morgenthau was in Merano, Italy on vacation in the summer of July 1936, when 
the Spanish Civil War began. Unable to return to Madrid because of the fighting, 
Morgenthau and his wife stayed in Italy for several months before continuing to Paris, 
where they were to later learn that the Institute in Madrid had closed.25 Forced out of 
Germany, unable to work in France, and now shut out of Spain, Morgenthau and his wife 
were forced to look outside Europe for a place to live. Whilst he had not previously 
considered the United States as a possible home, it rapidly appeared, in light of the 
growing anti-semitism in Europe, as one of the few options available to him. It proved 
difficult, however, to get an entry visa, but after some time and through a combination of 
good luck and good connections, Morgenthau and his wife immigrated to the United 
States in July 1937.26 In doing so, Morgenthau joined the great wave of refugees who fled 
to North America from Nazi Germany and who helped fight America’s war. Unlike many 
of his contemporaries, however, Morgenthau’s contribution to America was neither the 
defeat of the Nazis nor the creation of the Atomic Bomb; his war was the Cold War, his 
enemy was the Soviet Union, and his contribution was the political theory of realism.  
 
On the road to that contribution, however, Morgenthau had first to support 
himself by working as an instructor in government at Brooklyn College.27 While there, 
Morgenthau made it clear through his teaching that despite his experiences over the last 
few years, and despite his difficulties in Germany and Switzerland, he had resisted 
radicalization and had in fact remained the staunch German Conservative of his youth. 
                                                 
24 Frie, Hans J. Morgenthau, 50. 
25 Frie, Hans J. Morgenthau, 57.   
26 Frie, Hans J. Morgenthau, 59-61. Frie records that the Morgenthaus were able to get a visa to the U.S. in 
part because of a note of support from Irma Morgenthau’s wealthy second cousin, Samuel Rothschild. 
27 “Hans Joachim Morgenthau,” Current Biography 1963, ed. Charles Moritz, (New York: The M.W. 
Wilson Company, 1963), 275. 
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Morgenthau maintained his conservatism even to the extent of having difficulty with 
students over his “anti-communist position.”28 In light of these difficulties, it is perhaps 
not surprising that Morgenthau was happy to leave Brooklyn in 1939 for a full time job at 
the University of Kansas City, even though the position carried a heavy teaching load of 
18 hours split between the Liberal Arts College and the School of Law.29 Even at Kansas, 
however, Morgenthau continued to be dogged by controversy. Feuding with the 
administration, for example, resulted in his being fired, and although, rather like his 
experience with habilitation in Germany, he later forced the decision to be reversed, he 
made few friends in Kansas. Despite the feuds, however, he did take the opportunity to 
become both a U.S. citizen and a member of the Missouri Bar.30 In September 1943 
Morgenthau’s life took a dramatic turn - perhaps even more significant for Morgenthau 
than his original entry into the United States: he was offered the opportunity to leave 
Kansas by replacing Quincy Wright for 6 months at the University of Chicago.31 The 
position was to be the making of Morgenthau. 
At Chicago, first as a visiting and subsequently as a permanent Associate 
Professor, Morgenthau began work in the then new interdisciplinary subject of 
International Relations. In 1946 he published his first monograph, Scientific Man versus 
Power Politics. Following this success, Morgenthau turned his attention to what was to 
be his greatest work, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, the 
first edition of which was published in September 1948. The book was immensely 
popular, filling a gap in the market for an up to date text to supply the growing population 
of US universities. Proving far more popular than its main competitor, Fredrick 
Schuman’s International Politics, Morgenthau’s book was the first coherent text that 
sought to make sense of the postwar world. On the strength of this success Morgenthau 
became a Full Professor in 1949 at the age of 45, and in 1950 was awarded funding to set 
up the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy in 1950 of which he 
remained the Director until 1968.32 
It was during these years that Morgenthau’s work became an essential fixture on 
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the syllabi of so many courses in International Relations taught across the country, and 
during this same time that realism became an integral part of IR theory. Indeed within a 
month of the book’s publication, it was adopted as a textbook for foreign policy and 
international relations by Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia and Notre Dame, and 
within six months by ninety additional colleges.33 Arguing that "international politics, 
like all politics, is a struggle for power," Morgenthau proposed that the only correct 
approach to the conduct of United States’ foreign policy was an approach based on the 
tenets of realism.34 Thus, only a robust application of balance of power politics would be 
sure to generate the most positive possible outcome for the United States. After the 
publication of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau found himself with the opportunity to 
express his concerns on an increasingly broad canvas.  
He did so within the context of the Cold War. While the origins of this ideological 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union can be traced back to 1917 and 
Lenin’s subsequent announcement of the Third International, the years immediately after 
1945 saw the conflict between the two remaining super powers escalate into a full-scale 
Cold War.35 As might be expected given both his background and his current residency, 
Morgenthau backed the United States. More than this, he specifically advocated an 
aggressive realist approach to U.S. foreign policy, an approach predicated less on 
securing an ideal peace between nations and more on recognizing that peace in the long-
term could only be achieved through a realistic assessment of national interest. In short, 
Morgenthau believed that the United States should practice what he preached.36 
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This presumed relationship between what Morgenthau taught and what U.S. 
diplomats practiced worked well throughout the 1950s. The result was Morgenthau’s 
increasing academic stature as he was offered Visiting Professorships across the country, 
including positions at Berkeley, Harvard, Northwestern, Columbia and Yale. His 
perceived direct relevance to future policy makers, militarists and analysts may be 
gauged from his frequent invitations to lecture at the Armed Forces Staff College, the 
NATO Defense College, and the Air, Army, Navy and National War Colleges, as well as 
his association with the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research.37 In all, and 
standing testament to his significance to the field, Morgenthau delivered over 1300 
formal guest lectures between 1950 and 1980.38  
In addition to his academic credits, Morgenthau throughout the 1950s grew in 
political fame as others perceived him to be a theorist willing and able to intervene and 
advise on matters of current policy. Thus, at the invitation of George Kennan, the author 
of the famous Long Telegram in 1947 which had first outlined the case for the policy of 
containment subsequently implemented by President Harry S. Truman, Morgenthau had 
right of audience at the State Department Planning Committee between 1948 and 1951 - 
the key years of the development of the realism-based policy of containment.39 In 1951 
the State Department drew upon Morgenthau’s presumed area of natural interest and 
expertise by asking him to make an official visit to occupied Austria and to offer advice 
on the removal of Allied control and the restoration of sovereignty. Building on this visit, 
and perhaps in recognition of the larger relevance assigned to Morgenthau’s work, the 
Department subsequently invited Morgenthau to visit South East Asia in 1954. The visit 
proved to be the start of a turning point in Morgenthau’s career causing him ultimately to 
come into conflict with the practitioners of policy within the U.S. Government.40  
Warnings About Vietnam 
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During his visit Morgenthau had the opportunity to make the acquaintance of 
South Vietnamese policymakers of the highest level, including a meeting with Ngo Dinh 
Diem himself. Morgenthau published the findings of his trip to South East Asia in a 
series of articles in The New Republic. In these essays Morgenthau sounded a note of 
warning. At first glance the warning might have appeared odd, in light of the fact that 
U.S. policy in South East Asia appeared to be based on the very theories of realism 
propounded by Morgenthau in the classrooms of Chicago. Visiting Vietnam, however, 
and seeing the consequences of U.S. involvement in the region, prompted Morgenthau to 
analyze the likely causes and consequences behind the U.S. presence. Outlining the 
situation, Morgenthau described the war as consisting of one superpower engaged in 
warfare and diplomacy in a region outside its direct and natural area of concern, and 
another much smaller power engaged in (depending on one’s point of view) a civil war or 
at the very least local war.41 
Thus right from the beginning of his association with Vietnam, Morgenthau 
expressed reservations about U.S policy. In particular, Morgenthau had a fundamentally 
hesitant view about John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959. In his piece on Dulles published in 1961 as a chapter in 
An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, 
Morgenthau fiercely criticized the development of U.S. foreign policy under Dulles.42 
Suggesting that Dulles was simply not up to the task, and furthermore was one who gave 
the impression to those with whom he dealt of being deceptive, Morgenthau evidenced 
his growing disillusionment with those in government who were in charge of the conduct 
of U.S. foreign affairs. After his first experience of Vietnam, Morgenthau’s growing 
disillusionment with the actual conduct of foreign policy became more obvious through 
his writings and public pronouncements over the course of the next few years. Thus 
although Morgenthau acted as a consultant for the Department of Defense as late as 1962, 
his growing disenchantment with the actual conduct of the foreign policy of the United 
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States increasingly led him to voice criticism of the government. 
Thus even as his seminal work was becoming an essential part of the International 
Relations canon, Morgenthau, in response to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, began to shift 
his political focus. He did so in the full glare of the popular political limelight. With the 
fruition of television as a medium for popular political discussion, Morgenthau became 
increasingly involved in public debate. This was especially true when, following the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the fall of Diem, the Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration significantly escalated the military involvement of the United States in the 
conflict in Vietnam. Morgenthau became increasingly concerned, and after observing the 
course of the conflict in the early part of 1965, argued in a major piece published in The 
New York Times that the United States should extract itself from Indo-China by 
diplomatic means.43 In the event, 1965 did prove to be a turning point in U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam but not for the reasons hoped for by Morgenthau. Ironically the 
year was also a turning point for Morgenthau’s public and private political theories.  
Responding to Johnson’s Johns Hopkins University speech of April 7, 
Morgenthau praised Johnson for recognizing that the communist world was not a 
monolith and for accepting that the United States would need to have a repertoire of 
different types of responses to different types of situations. Referring to this particular 
situation, Morgenthau explained that “we are militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of a 
basic principle of our foreign policy that was implicit in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 
and that was put into practice by John Foster Dulles from 1947 onwards. This principle is 
the military containment of communism.”44 According to Morgenthau it was now time to 
change the policy, to adopt a different repertoire for a different situation: “…the 
alternative to our present policies in Vietnam would be this: a face-saving agreement 
which would allow us to disengage ourselves militarily…; restoration of the status quo of 
the Geneva Agreement of 1954, with special emphasis upon all Vietnamese elections; co-
operation with the Soviet Union in support of a Titoist All-Vietnamese government 
which would be likely to emerge from such elections.”45  
Morgenthau’s criticism and call for withdrawal might appear odd given that 
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Politics Among Nations and its realist approach might be said to have provided a critical 
part of the intellectual framework for the development of the policy of containment. The 
paradox is easily resolved, however. Realism expects nation states to act according to 
their perceived self-interest. In his call for withdrawal and an effective acceptance of a 
communist Vietnam, Morgenthau was not suggesting that the United States abandon its 
natural self-interest. Rather, he was suggesting that the Cold War and the general fight 
against communism, though first targeted effectively against a Soviet Union perceived to 
be ideologically and territorially expansionist, had now blinded United States’ 
policymakers to the real interests of their state. For this ‘blinding’ Morgenthau placed a 
great deal of responsibility on John Foster Dulles: “it is ironic that this simple 
juxtaposition of “Communism” and “Free World” was erected by John Foster Dulles’ 
crusading moralism into the guiding principle of American foreign policy when the 
national communism of Yugoslavia, the neutralism of the Third World and the incipient 
split between the Soviet Union and China were rendering that juxtaposition invalid.”46  
Accusing policymakers of being blind to the United States’ real interests and 
focusing his critique upon one individual allowed Morgenthau to present his argument 
still within a realist framework. For what is significant about Morgenthau’s reasoning is 
that it was based not on a moral assessment of U.S. policy but rather on a realist analysis 
of what actions or policies in the given circumstances would best serve the interests of 
the United States. Thus Morgenthau explained, “for better or for worse we live again in 
an age of revolution. It is the task of statesmanship not to oppose what cannot be opposed 
with a chance of success but to bend it to one’s own interests.”47 Bismarck himself could 
hardly have phrased it better. In effect, it was no longer a realist policy for the United 
States to continue a military engagement in South East Asia. Quite the contrary. The 
realist policy would be to accept what could not be changed – the presence of 
communism in the region – and figure out how best to turn that presence to the advantage 
of the United States.   
If Morgenthau blamed Dulles for the mis-application of containment, he also 
blamed Diem for changing the rules of the game within Vietnam. According to 
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Morgenthau it was the refusal of Diem to agree to all-Vietnamese elections following 
what was supposed to be the temporary division at the 17th Parallel that committed the 
country to war.48  It was then the decision (and fault) of the United States “to change the 
character of the war by unilateral declaration from a South Vietnamese civil war to a war 
of ‘foreign aggression.’ Aggression from the north...”49 Morgenthau articulated his 
assessment of U.S. policy in Vietnam not merely to play the ‘blame game’ but in the real 
hope that his advice would be acted upon. Thus he concluded his review “hop[ing] and 
pray[ing] that vaunted pragmatism and common sense of the American mind…would act 
as a corrective upon those misconceptions before they lead us from the blind alley in 
which we find ourselves today to the rim of the abyss.”50 Again, it is worth reiterating 
that Morgenthau did not call for withdrawal because America was losing. He called for 
withdrawal because it was his belief that America could not win, and that to continue 
would therefore be to act contrary to America’s national interests. It would be to act 
contrary to the policies suggested by a realist understanding of international politics.  
In the aftermath of his New York Times piece, Morgenthau clearly nailed his flag 
to the mast of opposition to the war and was thus caught up in the maelstrom of academic 
debate over the utility and righteousness of American involvement in Vietnam. As The 
New York Times reported on May 2, 1965, the divisions within academia were not always 
along ‘party’ or traditional lines. Thus, the debate “…has now reached the point…where 
the prominent spokesmen of both sides are now fighting with each other, with Dean 
Rusk, the Phi Beta Kappa and Rhodes Scholar, condemning the opposition teachers and 
students; Joe Alsop calling Hans Morgenthau an ‘appeaser’ and Morgenthau describing 
Alsop’s pro-administration line a ‘scandal’”51 
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Perceived by the mid-1960s as a liberal both by many in Johnson’s cabinet and by 
many fellow academics such as Henry Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard University, 
Morgenthau was involved in a long-running series of political engagements or sparring 
matches. He did so as a member of what British author Malcolm Muggeridge has referred 
to as the “telly-dons” – academics, or in Oxbridge parlance, dons such as historians 
A.J.P. Taylor and Hugh Trevor-Roper who were a constant presence on television, 
educating and influencing popular opinion on a variety of subjects. Morgenthau’s success 
as a ‘telly-don’ in the United States in the post-war world derived at least in part, as had 
been the case for his first entrée into State Department business, from his Germanic 
heritage.  
By the 1950s, in American popular culture, through sources as varied as the 
character Ludwig von Drake in the Disney pantheon of roles, to the ‘professor’ in the 
science fiction film, The Day The Earth Stood Still, the idea of the German professor as 
an authoritative source of comment and intellectual superiority was well-established.  
Thus, Morgenthau with his heavy German accent and the precise yet somewhat 
ponderous manner of a Weimar-educated professor slotted into an already created role. 
He did so in an environment which was in its own way making use of popular media. In 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, the University of Chicago produced a radio program, The 
Roundtable, which was re-broadcast by radio stations all across the United States 
Befitting his role as a ‘telly-don’ (or in this case radio-don) Morgenthau was a regular 
participant on this show.52 Over the course of the decade, as Morgenthau’s fame grew, so 
the canvas on which he propounded his opinions, educating and influencing the public, 
expanded.  
Making his political sympathies plain, Morgenthau was prominent in the early 
days of the “Teach-In” movement on U.S. campuses and in May 1965 debated Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. in the first nationally televised teach-in.53 The next day, on NBC’s Meet 
the Press he debated Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a Soviet specialist at Columbia 
University.54 Following his appearances on television, Morgenthau continued to 
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articulate his opposition to the war in a variety of formats. Just a few days after the 
Teach-In, for example, Moregenthau debated Frank Sieverts, a former State Department 
official of hawkish mien, at the New School for Social Research in New York.55 
Similarly, on 21 June 1965 he participated in a CBS News Special debate between 
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor for  Presidents Kennedy and Johnson from 
1961-1966, Zbigniew Brezinski, G. J. Pauker, Rand Institute Asia specialist, O. Edmund 
Club, a former Asian expert who had been forced out of the State Department during the 
Eisenhower purges, and John D. Donahue, a former advisor to the South Vietnamese 
government.  
In addition to speaking against the war, Morgenthau, perhaps inspired by his own 
position as a public academic (or telly-don), also articulated his views upon the correct 
role of intellectuals in society. According to Morgenthau, in an essay published in The 
New Republic in 1966, the intellectual was faced with a number of choices. First, he 
could excuse himself from the political world altogether; second, he could offer policy 
advice whilst remaining detached from the political process; and finally, he could 
actively involve himself in the world of politics as an expert. In light of the active 
political life adopted by Morgenthau, both during the height of the early Cold War and 
later with regard to Vietnam, and based on the lives and careers of academics he had 
admired as a student, it was clear that it was his belief that the intellectual had an 
obligation to help guide and improve government policy, “to involve himself in the world 
of politics as an expert.” Significantly, however, this role was to be played not as a 
politician, but as an academic expert, for it was the very fact of being an outsider, or 
depending on one’s point of view an insider protected from the outside that protected the 
academic from the pressures of politics. As Morgenthau phrased it, it was “…his 
immunity from outside pressure, manifested through job security through tenure” that 
gave the academic the freedom to criticize and advise. Referring specifically to his own 
situation, Morgenthau continued:  
“This immunity provides the academic with opportunity as well as with 
temptation. He has the freedom to speak truth to power without needing to be 
afraid of more than irritating reprisals of the powers that be. The White House 
could threaten me with the FBI, and make the Internal Revenue Service waste 
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many man powers on repeated audits of my income tax return; it could order the 
Secretary of Defense to fire me as consultant to the Department of Defense, 
banish me from the councils of government, and ostracize me socially. But it 
could not deprive me of my livelihood or of my freedom to speak and write in so 
far as the media were willing to resist its pressure to deny me a hearing.”56 
 
With these words, Morgenthau both challenged his harassment by the government 
and questioned President Johnson’s commitment to the democratic process. Johnson, 
according to Morgenthau, equated “…dissent with disloyalty.”57 Comparing Johnson 
with some of his predecessors, Morgenthau suggested “I have taken a look at Woodrow 
Wilson’s and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attitudes towards domestic dissent and I have been 
struck not by the similarity but by the differences between their democratic ethos and the 
climate of opinion prevailing today.”58 Extending his argument in order to defend Senator 
Fulbright, also under criticism from Johnson, Morgenthau claimed that. “…the President 
has never deigned to argue with the Senator but has ridiculed and mimicked him and 
treated him with contempt in public and to his face. White House-broken journalists have 
taken their cue and have treated a brilliant, knowledgeable and high-minded public 
servant as though he were an ignorant, irresponsible fool.” Morgenthau continued his 
attack by suggesting that the treatment to which Fulbright had been subjected was not 
unique. “It is but a particularly spectacular and distressing example of a general policy. 
The White House ‘project Morgenthau’ which in 1965 had the task to disseminate 
information about me reflects the same general attitude.”  
It is clear from Morgenthau’s writings of this era that he firmly believed himself 
to be the victim of a harassment campaign by the White House. Indeed as David Sanford 
later pointed out in his piece in The New Republic in 1969, Morgenthau’s son Matthew 
was drafted even though he was in a category of men (for medical reasons) not usually 
drafted. Furthermore, claimed Sanford, Matthew was persecuted and court-martialed 
during his basic training in Alabama, essentially because of his father’s political 
statements against the war.59 What matters here, is not so much whether either Hans or 
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Matthew Morgenthau were actually the targets of harassment but that they believed 
themselves to be so and acted and wrote accordingly.  
In light of Morgenthau’s past experiences both as a refugee from Nazi Germany 
and as an observer of the McCarthy Era, his apparent surprise and anger at his treatment 
by the White House might appear as somewhat naïve: he surely must have experienced 
and seen far worse than a few intensive tax audits, or even the unwarranted drafting of his 
son. In fact, his response is, I believe, comprehensible within the context of 
Morgenthau’s status as an immigrant whereby he, like many immigrants, thought better 
of the country he had chosen to call home and the country which had given him better 
hospitality than his own. Thus, in his expectations of government behavior, Morgenthau 
the refugee, thinking well of his adopted homeland, overwhelmed Morgenthau the 
intellectual who could expect nothing but realpolitik from the governments of nation 
states.  
 Perhaps understandably in light of what he perceived to be the nature of his own 
situation, and aggravated by his belief in the responsibility of the intellectual to engage 
with the needs of society and government, Morgenthau had little sympathy with 
academics who either chose to stay on the political sidelines, or worse, chose to enter the 
fray in absolute and fixed support of the government. Morgenthau offered a searing 
critique of the academy when he suggested that the military-industrial complex against 
which President Eisenhower had warned had been “duplicated by an academic-political 
complex in which the interests of the government are inextricably intertwined with the 
interests of large groups of academics.” Furthermore, “the intimate connection that 
research contracts have established between the government and the universities have 
recently been brought to public attention. It stands to reason that an academic who is 
working on such a contract or who expects to work on one is not likely to question the 
basic policies of the government either within his contractual research or outside it.” As a 
result, according to Morgenthau, “…the interests and expectations of the government not 
only determine the subject matter of contractual research but also influence ever so subtly 
its scope and in a certain measure its results.” 60 Morgenthau’s understanding of both the 
ideal and the actual relationship between academics and governments was undoubtedly 
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shaped by his own experiences – most recently through his work with the State 
Department but also by his earlier work in Spain, and perhaps even by his observations of 
the role played by Carl Schmitt in Hitler’s Germany.61  
 
Morgenthau’s growing disenchantment with the government of his adopted 
homeland started to become increasingly evident. When it was disclosed that the National 
Student Association had been established and run as an instrument of state policy in order 
to help wage the Cold War, Morgenthau once again reflected publicly in print on what he 
perceived to be the treason of the intellectuals.62  He argued that a large number of 
academics, although doing so less blatantly than the National Student Association were in 
essence “…making it appear as though the voice of the government were of necessity the 
voice of truth…”.63 Morgenthau believed that revelations in the media about the domestic 
role of the CIA “…raises three fundamental issues: [1] the ability of American 
democracy to pursue an effective foreign policy without destroying at home what it 
promotes abroad; [2] the feasibility and morality of domestic clandestine operations; [3] 
the relations between the Federal government and the intellectual community.”64 Holding 
that a domestic government, presiding over a pluralistic society, must somehow manage 
to mobilize private organizations on behalf of its policies, Morgenthau questioned how 
that could be achieved without impairing, if not destroying, the ‘private’ character of 
such organizations?”65   
Applauding the eventual revelation of the truth behind the National Student 
Association, Morgenthau yet regretted that “…a heavy price has to be paid for this 
assertion of democratic scrutiny both domestically and internationally.” Morgenthau 
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suggested that “had the Government had more confidence in the strength of a free 
democracy than in the efficiency of pseudo-totalitarian methods, it could have served the 
national interest without paying so heavy a price. Internationally, all individuals and 
organizations speaking on behalf of the United States will from now on be suspect as 
secret agents of the government.”66 Morgenthau virulently criticized the policymakers for 
having created a situation where “domestically the moral confidence of the people in 
their government has been shaken. This is not a moral crisis affecting this particular 
Administration but a moral crisis affecting American democracy.” Contrasting the 
sixteenth century perception of diplomats as honest men sent abroad to lie for their 
country, Morgenthau suggested that in the twentieth century public officials were 
increasingly perceived to be honest men “staying at home to lie for the government.”67  
Arguing that the government practiced “systematic deception paralleling that practiced by 
the CIA.” Morgenthau asserted that this philosophy was “…not of democracy but of 
totalitarianism.” Furthermore argued Morgenthau, “as the integrity and independence of 
the government have been subverted by the military industrial complex, so the integrity 
and independence of the educational community have been impaired by the academic-
political complex. The educational community has in large measure become the 
handmaid of government, while maintaining its pretence to independence.” Offering a 
solution to the problems raised by the disclosures of government deception, Morgenthau 
called for “…a radical moral reorientation of both the government and the academic 
community.”68 
Morgenthau took his political engagement to its logical conclusion by involving 
himself in the 1968 Presidential campaign as an advisor to Eugene McCarthy. Following 
Johnson’s dramatic withdrawal, Morgenthau put his experience of international affairs at 
McCarthy’s disposal, and became a charter member of a special advisory panel on 
foreign policy put together by McCarthy.69 Under the chairmanship of Stanley Hoffman 
of Harvard University, Morgenthau served alongside Quincy Wright, formerly of the 
University of Virginia, John Kenneth Galbraith then teaching economics at Harvard, and 
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Gabriel Almond then of Stanford University, but formerly of the University of Chicago, 
and the serving president of the American Political Science Association. Morgenthau 
made his support of McCarthy public through an article in the New York Review of 
Books, then a relatively newly established liberal counterweight to Commentary. 
Given that Morgenthau had described U.S. foreign policy toward Vietnam as 
being in part a function of the psychopathology of certain individuals, he offered a 
contrasting image of McCarthy, writing that “…what struck me again the other day…is 
the complete absence of any visible contrast between the public role he plays and the man 
he is.”70 Morgenthau supported McCarthy for three reasons. Firstly, he would restore 
“…a philosophy of government and of the American purpose that is in tune with the 
genius of the American people.”71 Secondly, “…he can move large masses of the 
American people and, more particularly, of the younger generation back into active 
participation in the democratic process.” Thirdly, “he presents clear cut alternatives to the 
policies of the present administration as well as of his competitors.” With regard to 
foreign policy, Morgenthau argued that McCarthy’s policies would be in essence 
“…common sense restored to its rightful place.”72 Emphasizing his support, Morgenthau 
quoted approvingly from McCarthy’s own work, The Limits of Power: “…our foreign 
policy should be more restrained and in so far as prudent judgment can determine more 
closely in keeping with the movement of history.”73 Taking a sideswipe at Johnson’s 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey by attacking Zbigniew Brzezinski who had been 
Humphrey’s primary foreign policy advisor, Morgenthau claimed that, “McCarthy does 
not believe in the philosophy of American paramountcy as propounded by Professor 
Brzezinski.”74 Furthermore proposed Morgenthau, the United States should, if it sought 
to influence other states, focus on its own domestic policies first. Thus “…we serve our 
goal of promoting racial justice throughout the world better by setting an example in the 
ordering of our race relations at home than by exerting pressure on South Africa.”75 
Morgenthau concluded by suggesting that the American mission was not to dominate but 
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to lead.  
In his support for McCarthy, Morgenthau succeeded in defending his own past 
theories of realism even as he criticized their subsequent mis-application by particular 
policymakers. According to Morgenthau, McCarthy was “convinced that the great 
innovations that radically transformed American policy in the Spring of 1947 – the policy 
of containment, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan – are irreversible but he also 
believes that these policies suffer from two major deficiencies:…they have not been 
adapted to drastically changed circumstances, and they have been corrupted by a 
disproportionate emphasis on military measures.”76 With this analysis Morgenthau 
defended both realism and Politics Among Nations, considered by some to be as much a 
part of the process of arming for the Cold War as any military preparations. In particular, 
and perhaps fittingly in light of the war’s significance to his own intellectual 
development, Morgenthau drew on his own service to government as a means of 
attacking Humphrey. Specifically he made clear that “from personal observation, the war 
could have had no more genuinely committed supporter than the Vice President. It is only 
now, in an election year, that the Vice President feels compelled to make this appear to be 
Mr. Johnson’s war but not necessarily Mr. Humphrey’s.”77 
By November 1968, the Democratic Party had made its choice. The Chicago 
Nominating Convention had come and gone and the American people were about to go to 
the polls. In his piece “Nixon versus Humphrey: The Choice,” Morgenthau explained the 
absolute importance of the coming election by suggesting rather dramatically that the 
very survival of American democracy depended upon the election’s outcome.78 
Morgenthau believed that the threat to democracy came from two directions: on the one 
hand, the lack of any clear difference in terms of substantive policy between Humphrey 
and Nixon; on the other from the Wallace ticket.79 By election time with the possibility of 
a successful Wallace-LeMay ticket, no matter how unlikely this really was, Morgenthau 
argued for the lesser of two evils. In the absence of a vote which would put Wallace into 
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the White House and LeMay into the U.S. Naval Observatory, Morgenthau suggested “if 
the choice were simply between Humphrey and Nixon within the traditional context of a 
two-party system, I would have said that the choice is a matter of political taste but not 
political judgment since there is really nothing to choose between their qualifications. 
There is no lesser evil to be preferred since both candidates portend evils different in kind 
but not in degree.” In the concrete circumstances of the perceived possibility of a Wallace 
Presidency, however, Morgenthau argued that it was the candidate who was best capable 
of stopping such an event who should be supported.  Making the case that not alone 
would it be necessary to stop Wallace in 1968 but also in 1972, Morgenthau argued that 
“…American democracy seems to be best served not only by Nixon’s victory in 1968 but 
also by a defeat of the Democratic Party so drastic as to amount to the disavowal of its 
present leadership, philosophy, and policies and to render inevitable the radical 
transformation of its philosophy and structure.” Morgenthau continued “for without such 
a defeat…the Democratic Party may consistently and on a large scale…act out what 
Wallace preaches.” Only if the Democratic Party of Johnson and those of a similar world 
view are defeated, only then “…will the men who could have saved it in 1968 – the 
Kennendys, the McCarthys, the McGoverns and their heirs have a chance to save it in 
1972.”80  
Drastic words indeed. In the event, Nixon did win the election but contrary to 
Morgenthau’s hopes, the Democratic Party did not take this as a sign of a need to re-
invent itself and subsequently lost the next election too. By that time, however, 
Morgenthau had already removed himself from the center of political affairs by 
transferring from Chicago to New York where he taught at the New School with the rank 
of full City University of New York Professor until his retirement from full time teaching 
in 1974. Even then, however, he found it difficult to give everything up and so continued 
to teach a light load at the New School. He also continued to involve himself, albeit 
gently, with progressive affairs, serving, for example, as the Chair of The Academic 
Committee for Soviet Jewry, helping to facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jewish 
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dissidents.81 He argued in support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment which linked the 
granting of most-favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R. to that country’s granting of civil 
liberties to ethnic minorities, residing within its borders82. He also continued to concern 
himself, almost unto his death in 1980 from complications after a stomach ulcer 
operation, with what he considered to be the proper course for U.S. foreign policy in the 
post-Nixon environment by publishing such papers as “The Pathology of American 
Power,” a salutary warning for the West to avoid a new Cold War.83  
By the time of his death, Morgenthau had come full circle: from his first troubled 
semester at Brooklyn College he had become the ‘grand old man’ of political science 
with a personal chair at the same university. If he had traveled a circular path 
professionally, however, he appeared to have taken almost a linear political journey: from 
being the uncritical exponent of the politics of raison d’etat to becoming a critic of the 
state and articulating opinions which would not have been incompatible with those of 
teenage political pamphleteers. The reality of this characterization is not quite so 
straightforward, however. It is my contention that while Morgenthau in his stand against 
U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and in his virulent criticisms of U.S. policymakers 
appeared to be rejecting the ideas laid out in Politics Among Nations, he was actually still 
advocating the same policies, albeit with a slight twist. He still advocated, for example, in 
favor of policies which would reflect the interests of the United States. Thus he still 
advocated realism. He simply believed, now, after several decades’ association with 
power that those interests might be expressed in a different manner. Thus he suggested 
that “it has become obvious that the great issues of our day – the militarization of 
American life, the Vietnam War, race conflicts, poverty, the decay of cities – are not 
susceptible to rational solutions within the existing system of power relations…” 
Likewise, he believed that “poverty on a large scale, like the decay of the cities and the 
ruination of the natural environment, is a result not of accidental misfortunes but of social 
and economic policies in whose continuation powerful social groups have a vested 
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interest.”84 
According to Morgenthau neither the continuation of poverty nor the 
militarization of American life could in any sense be considered as reflective of U.S. 
national interests. Thus, according to any realist interpretation of the political system, it 
behoved America to solve these problems first, before it engaged in issues beyond its 
immediate concern. From this perspective Morgenthau may be seen to be far more 
consistent than has previously been thought to be the case. He articulated a realist 
framework (with all the potential for military engagement that framework implied) in 
order to meet what he perceived to be the very real threat of Soviet expansionism; he 
advocated withdrawal from Vietnam when he perceived it to be against America’s 
national interests to remain militarily committed; and he called for resolution of 
America’s most pressing and most divisive domestic problems because he perceived such 
resolution and resultant domestic unity to be in the country’s long-term interests. 
In much the same way, one might argue, did Bismarck institute old age pensions 
and a limited form of sickness insurance: not because he believed in the worth of the 
programs as a means of helping German citizens, but because he perceived their 
institution to be a means of undercutting support for the Social Democratic Party, a much 
more important objective for the German Empire than the financial costs of any programs 
of relief. Thus the larger national security interests of Germany were preserved even if 
the actual policies implemented appeared contrary to the innate conservatism of the 
government. Likewise, the larger national security interests of the United States, the 
preservation of the state, dictated the resolution of domestic divisions even though the 
implementation of policies such as welfare relief, or anti-racist initiatives might appear 
contrary to the general conservatism of the government.  
Thus, as I suggested in my introduction, realism, whether propounded by 
Bismarck or Morgenthau was a conservative doctrine, being based on the assumption that 
states, under perceived conditions of relative scarcity of essential resources, would pursue 
power, as defined by national interest and survival. This realism contained within it, 
however, a progressive liberatory potential since in order to preserve the state, it allowed 
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for the implementation of a wide range of policies – both in the domestic and foreign 
policy sphere - the value of which was to be judged according to their utility to the 
interests of the state, not according to a narrowly defined expression of political bias. 
Thus Morgenthau in advocating the containment of communism in Western Europe had 
begun his academic career as a realist, and despite appearances to the contrary, he had, by 
advocating the acceptance of communism in South East Asia, ended it as a realist. This 
combination of progressivism and constancy was perhaps most obvious when 
Morgenthau involved himself in popular and public politics. It was also obvious, 
however, if one read Morgenthau’s realist masterpiece, Politics Among Nations, with the 
same attention to detail with which he wrote it. It is time now to do just that.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Politics Among Nations: The Duality of Realism 
 
 
 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace was Morgenthau’s 
masterpiece. First published in 1948, successive editions appeared in 1953, 1960, 1967, 
1973, 1978 and 1985.85 While each edition carried the same title, however, the sum total 
over the course of Morgenthau’s career really amounts to more than one book re-
published six times.86 Indeed a close reading of the text of each edition suggests that 
Morgenthau should more properly be credited with producing a corpus of work 
representing a lifetime’s thought and analysis. Specifically, over the course of his six 
editions, Morgenthau examined the most fitting and profitable role to be adopted by 
states in international relations, the means by which states acquired and maintained 
power, and the most likely means by which states might attain and preserve peace. More 
succinctly, with each edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau shaped the very 
field of international relations according to his conception not of how the world should or 
could work in the future but how it actually worked right now.  
While the substance of each edition remained largely the same, what changed, and 
what highlights the consistency of Morgenthau’s analysis was the manner in which 
Morgenthau made clear how his theories, the theories first presented in 1948, could and 
should be understood and implemented in the light of the changed political environment 
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of the moment.87 Thus while it is appropriate to claim originality in each edition, and 
while students reading different editions might well be struck by the differences between 
them, it is also true that at heart, each edition contained the same essential premise. What 
was constant for Morgenthau throughout his career was his belief that the core of his 
arguments remained the same, even as the situations to which they must be applied 
changed over time. Thus this chapter follows the mold created by its predecessor and 
seeks to prove that appearances to the contrary notwithstanding - six editions in thirty 
years - Politics Among Nations represents two critical elements of Morgenthau’s political 
thought: it was simultaneously constant yet flexible and contained within it the potential 
for both conservative and liberatory applications.  
Perhaps unusually, the bulk of the material from which Morgenthau prepared the 
first edition of Politics Among Nations consisted not of archival notes, nor even of his 
own notes of other books or case studies, but rather tape recordings made of his lectures 
at the University of Chicago. As Kenneth W. Thompson, one of Morgenthau’s research 
assistants reported, it was a tradition of students to tape the better professors, whose 
words were thought likely to be “destined for posterity.”88 Morgenthau was one of these 
professors, and it was the tapes and subsequent transcript by one particular graduate 
student, Mary Jane Benowitz, along with research and transcribing carried out by 
Thompson, which provided Morgenthau, who lectured without notes, with a written copy 
of both his lectures and what would prove to be the outline for his book. Morgenthau 
recognized his debt to Benowitz in the preface of the first edition. Over the course of 
succeeding years, many other students helped Morgenthau organize both his thoughts and 
his writing. In this sense at least, one might even suggest that Politics Among Nations 
was something of a collaborative work. If it was, however, it was so only in the labor-
intensive parts of its production. For as useful as Morgenthau found his research team, he 
                                                 
87 John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neo-traditionalism, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 36. 
88  Kenneth W. Thompson, “The Writing of Politics Among Nations: Its Sources and its Origins,” 
International Studies Notes, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999. 
 
 
 
 33
rarely discussed the origins of his work nor shared his analysis of its implications but 
rather used his students as a resource, asking them to provide copies of particular events 
or case studies for his review. Thus while students provided the material, Morgenthau 
provided the conceptual framework into which it was placed.  
 
As might be expected, Morgenthau’s Preface to his first edition was quite 
straightforward, simply acknowledging his research debts and largely allowing the text to 
speak for itself. Thus the book was to cover not only the traditional subject matter of 
international relations courses but to place particular emphasis upon the “basic problems 
of international law, international organization, and diplomatic history.”89 The text itself 
established the parameters of realism. Putting forward his central theory concerning the 
behavior of nation states, Morgenthau claimed that whatever diplomatic posturing might 
be assumed, in the final analysis all states would seek the greatest amount of power and 
security possible, even to the point of using military force to achieve it, while accepting 
no check upon individual national sovereignty from any international, or supranational, 
body.90  
Even as he emphasized the centrality of the balance of power between nation 
states as the key means by which nations could pursue both power and peace, however, 
he also discussed the possible role that could be played by “normative limitations” such 
as “international law, international morality, and world public opinion.”91 Indeed for 
Morgenthau, ultimately it was the future obsolescence of nation states, and the giving up 
of national sovereignty to supranational bodies, which would be the only way to secure 
permanent international peace. This assertion can be read in two ways: on the one hand, 
as an affirmation of the primacy of the nation state as the key actor in world politics – 
only upon its demise could permanent peace be secured; on the other hand, Morgenthau’s 
text could be read as an aspiration of what supranational institutions might one day 
achieve. Until that time was reached, however, Morgenthau offered a theory of 
understanding which while acknowledging the limits of “the influence of ethics” yet 
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acknowledged that statesmen were not solely “moved by considerations of material 
power.” Thus even as he acknowledged overall the weight of the pursuit of power, he 
also paid homage to other non-material influences which might shape both policymakers 
and the decision they made.92  
Having established the theory, Morgenthau then sought to apply it to the 
contemporary international situation, and to offer an analysis of the effects of its 
application upon contemporary United States actual and ideal foreign policy. As we have 
seen, the book, and the theories contained within it, received tremendous popular and 
academic acclaim, setting Morgenthau on his way to becoming an integral member of the 
U.S. intellectual elite. One contemporary review referred to Politics Among Nations as 
“the most incisive book of its kind.”93 In a similar vein Harold Sprout, Professor and later 
Chair of the Politics Department at Princeton University, while taking issue with some of 
Morgenthau’s arguments, made clear that he believed Morgenthau to have “set a high 
standard for all who would venture into the treacherous quicksand of system building in 
international politics. Politics Among Nations is a work of major importance. It should do 
much to promote better teaching and scholarship in the critically important field of 
international politics”94 And indeed it did. Thus contemporary scholar, and later 
policymaker Henry Kissinger argued that it was through the publication of Politics 
Among Nations, along with his other work, that Morgenthau created the discipline of 
post-war International relations 95 Likewise, fifty years after the event, scholar John 
Vasquez observed that in Politics Among Nations, “Morgenthau best expressed and 
captured what an entire generation of realist scholars…were trying to understand.”96  
 
Six years later Politics Among Nations was reissued as a Second Edition. In the 
Preface Morgenthau took great pains to emphasize the distinctions between the two 
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editions, and in so doing revealed as much about the context of the first edition as about 
the second. Morgenthau explained the “considerable changes” which he had made to this 
edition by referencing the “new developments during the last six years in the intellectual 
climate of the United States, the conditions of world politics, and the mind of the 
author.”97 Specifically, Morgenthau drew the reader’s attention to the circumstances 
surrounding the production of his first edition, the result of “an intellectual experience of 
twenty years.” Its origins lay in a period when “a false conception of foreign policy, put 
into practice by the western democracies, [had] led inevitably to the threat and the 
actuality of totalitarianism and war.” 98 Clearly Morgenthau had been deeply affected by 
what he perceived to be the betrayal of appeasement and blamed ‘guilty men’ such as 
Neville Chamberlain for their failure to act in a manner which would have preserved the 
security and interests not only of the United Kingdom but of Western democracy.99  
Fighting against such a lackluster interpretations of states’ rights and 
responsibilities, and such a weak interpretation of what it was possible for states to 
achieve, Morgenthau in the first edition of Politics Among Nations, had put forward the 
case for an aggressive diplomacy, or what he termed a “frontal attack,” a “radical” 
statement which made clear just how much independence of action each state 
possessed.100 In essence Morgenthau had put forward the case for realism, urging his 
fellow intellectuals and contemporaries in the world of diplomacy to concentrate on the 
realities of the world situation – the reality of a weak United Nations in the midst of 
strong nation states – rather than on what they hoped might become the situation – a 
strong United Nations capable of imposing its peaceful will upon subservient nation 
states.  
In his call Morgenthau was undoubtedly influenced by what he perceived to have 
been the failure of international politics in the inter-war years, a period when academics 
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and politicians alike appeared to have focused so much on what they had hoped could be 
achieved that they had placed excessive confidence in institutions and organizations 
which in reality had had little effect upon what was actually achieved. They had, in 
effect, hoped that a strong League of Nations or a forceful International Court of Justice 
would be able to impose their peaceful will upon subservient and compliant nation states.  
Thus whether one looked at Woodrow Wilson at the start of the age, or Neville 
Chamberlain at the end, each, and many others in between, were guilty of hoping that 
international law or agreed upon norms of behavior would be sufficient to ensure peace 
between nations. As Morgenthau was only too well aware, the policymakers’ hopes had 
not been met. In Morgenthau’s direct experience the ‘struggle for power’ by Hitler’s 
Germany (amongst others) had overwhelmed the democracies’ ‘struggle for peace.’ 
Based on this personal experience, as well as an academic understanding of international 
relations, Morgenthau, in the first edition of Politics Among Nations, had emphasized the 
reality that nations would, in the final analysis, always be struggling for power, but he 
also offered the hope that a state of international peace would be the most desirable. Until 
such a state was achieved, however, (most likely by the real conceding of national power 
to a supranational body), he argued that the theory by which one attempted to understand 
the world should be shaped by how the world actually was, not by what one hoped it 
might become. In short he argued that international relations should be understood within 
a realist, not an idealist framework.101 
Six years on Morgenthau considered himself to have been successful. From his 
viewpoint, the United States had stood up to the Soviet Union, contained the spread of 
communism in Europe and achieved the friendship of like-minded states. Six years on 
“with that battle largely won,” Morgenthau perceived himself, and the United States, free 
to shift in focus a little and to consider the changed nature of the international arena. Not 
only had the United Nations achieved far more than he had considered likely six years 
previously but particular groups of nation states had co-operated to form regional 
supranational bodies. Thus, according to Morgenthau, it was now possible to consolidate 
the victory of having his earlier robust theories accepted by now not only consolidating 
and defending his arguments, but where necessary, adapting them to new situations and 
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experiences.102 
Of the many new situations perceived by Morgenthau he was perhaps most struck 
by the possible consequences of decolonization, the rise of supranational regional 
institutions, and the activities of the United Nations. According to Morgenthau “the 
colonial revolution has spread over much of Asia and Africa and has increased in 
intensity, thus emerging as a new force in world politics, creating new problems, and 
calling for new policies.”103 Critically, and foreshadowing his later position on U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, Morgenthau adapted his theory of realism to include an entirely 
new component. In future, he argued, “the struggle for the minds of men” needed to be 
added to “the traditional dimensions of diplomacy and war.”104 Thus, even as early as 
1953, a year before Dien Bien Phu, and almost a decade ahead of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s call to win the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people, Morgenthau 
acknowledged the need to win the support of the people amongst whom, and with whom, 
the U.S. would later fight.105 He was clearly ahead of his time, recognizing that even as 
he had earlier asserted the rights of states to act independently and free of all fetters, they 
were in reality limited by their ability to win “the minds of men.”  
With this assessment Morgenthau had not abandoned his realist position. He still 
believed fiercely in the likelihood that states would act according to their perceived self-
interest. He was merely now acknowledging that it was not always as easy as it had once 
been. Where once might had made right, (whether one liked it or not) and where once 
Lord Palmerston’s Gunboat Diplomacy could assure the British Empire of the success of 
its endeavors, now the United States, and indeed the United Kingdom, corralled and 
limited by the colonial revolution with its unleashing of national aspirations and political 
ambition, could act only if they recognized that “the struggle for the minds of men” was a 
new and integral “dimension of international politics.”106  
In light of Morgenthau’s early recognition of the validity and, perhaps more 
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importantly, potential strength of the struggle to win men’s minds, as expressed in 1953, 
his later arguments against U.S. involvement in Vietnam make more sense. His 
experience visiting the country, along with his academic assessment of the diplomatic 
and military possibilities, led him to believe that this was one dimension of international 
politics which the United States could not win. As we have seen, Morgenthau considered 
the conflict in Vietnam to be a civil war and blamed U.S. policymakers for transforming 
it, in outward appearance at least, into a war of Northern aggression. As it was not such a 
war, it followed that it could not be won according to such terms. Thus it is apparent 
again, even as early as 1953 that what would later appear to be a liberal and progressive 
politics on the part of Morgenthau, was in reality, a willingness to adapt - by expanding 
and including new facets – his political theory to a changed situation.   
If Morgenthau was hesitant about the consequences of the colonial revolution, 
unsure of the likely effects upon the older imperial powers, he was impressed by the 
efforts of various nations to try and achieve a level of common interest through the 
creation of supranational organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This pooling of states’ sovereignty appealed to 
Morgenthau who saw within it a means of achieving both the broad objectives of the 
community and the specific aspirations of the member states. Here again we see 
Morgenthau the realist adapting his viewpoint in order to accommodate changed 
circumstances. And as would be the case for Vietnam, he proved to be right. The ECSC, 
as is well-known, proceeded to form the foundation for the success of what would 
become first the European Economic Community, and later the European Union.  
Published in 1953, the Second Edition was drafted in the shadow of the Korean 
War. Accordingly, the war and its consequences had “been worked into the theoretical 
framework of the book.”107 Indeed it was the Korean War which prompted Morgenthau 
to re-consider the potential utility of the United Nations. Disillusioned by the meager 
achievements of the inter-war League of Nations, Morgenthau, in the first edition of 
Politics Among Nations, had not initially expressed high hopes for the nascent United 
Nations. Six years later he was prepared to acknowledge that the organization had 
achieved a great deal, albeit in areas “fundamentally different” from those originally 
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conceived. It had been under the flag of the United Nations, for example, that the United 
States had been able to enter and fight the Korean War.108 
Morgenthau had two other innovations to bring to the Second Edition, both of 
which would, as was the case with Vietnam and the UN, foreshadow his later public 
positions. Morgenthau asserted that this second edition would take much more account of 
domestic politics, even to the point of asserting a “new rule of diplomacy” dealing “with 
the relationship between foreign and domestic policy.” 109 Again, as he foreshadowed 
events in Vietnam, Morgenthau, albeit with a slightly different focus, articulated the 
primacy of domestic politics six years before the publication of William Appleman 
Williams’ seminal work in the field, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.110 In this light, 
Morgenthau’s later call for the resolution of domestic racial divisions, the abolition of 
poverty and the cessation of environmental pollution appear less as radical statements of 
a newly found liberal conscience and more as the mature reflections of an academic 
convinced that the first step to securing a successful foreign policy is to implement a 
domestic policy which in meeting the needs of the people meets the needs of the state. 
Thus whether one places Morgenthau’s analysis within the context of Bismarck the 
‘conservative’ policymaker or Williams the ‘liberal’ academic, one can see that realism, 
though outwardly concerned with the behavior of states to each other, contained within it 
a strong element of potential progressivism.   
As we have seen, it was not just what Morgenthau said in the 1960s that led both 
some of his contemporaries and later scholars to perceive him as a conservative turned 
liberal, but the changed nature of his relationship with the United States government. He 
appeared to have transformed himself (or been transformed) from an ally of the state, 
expounding the amorality of realpolitik, to an extremely vocal critic, sure that the U.S. 
state was doing something very much immoral. In fact, the paradox is only illusory, and 
as with so much else, was foreshadowed in the Second Edition of Politics Among 
Nations. In his Preface, Morgenthau introduced as a new “element of national 
power…the quality of government.” It is against this articulation about the importance of 
                                                 
108 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2rd edition, 1954, Preface. 
109 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2rd edition, 1954, Preface. 
110 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972) 
First published in 1959. Williams is generally credited with being one of the first scholars to highlight the 
significance of domestic affairs as a determinant upon foreign policy.  
 40
the quality of government, written in 1954, that Morgenthau’s later assaults upon the 
Johnson administration must be placed. 111  
According to Morgenthau the quality of the government of a country was so 
important that it could, in certain circumstances, determine whether a country won or lost 
a war. Using as examples the cases of Austria-Hungary in the Great War, and France in 
the Second World War, Morgenthau argued that in both cases the failure of the 
relationship between the governed and the governors so degraded national morale that 
military success was no longer an option. Specifically, in Austria-Hungary the House of 
Hapsburg had failed to retain the loyalty of its Slavic subjects, and in France a significant 
proportion of the citizenry had preferred Hitler to the socialist Bloom. Aggravating the 
defeat in both instances was that the initial lack of solidarity caused by the government, 
further prompted the citizenry to reject the government and thus led to eventual national 
destruction.112 As an alternative, Morgenthau proposed what he believed to be the 
hallmarks of good or effective government: one which would cherish all of the children 
of the nation equally and enlist the strength of sectional groups into a common struggle 
for the good of all.   
Taking account of all these changes in international politics, Morgenthau in 1953 
informed his readers that his ideas on a great many issues had also changed. He had 
refined his analysis of such integral concepts as power, cultural imperialism, world public 
opinion, disarmament, collective security and peaceful change. Furthermore, his analysis 
of politics among nations had been expanded to include the new flash-words of the age 
such as containment, cold war, uncommitted nations and Point Four. Thus Morgenthau 
prepared his readers for an adjusted interpretation of the rights and responsibilities of 
nation states, as well as an acknowledgement that the world had changed in the course of 
the past six years. Putting the two together, however, did not produce an abnegation of 
realism but rather a readjustment to suit different times. 
 
As a means of articulating the precise nature of that realist framework, 
Morgenthau included a new introductory chapter which outlined what, for Morgenthau, 
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constituted the six principles of political realism.113 Given the centrality of these 
principles to Morgenthau’s intellectual framework, it is worth analyzing them in some 
detail, particularly so that we might see the extent to which they foreshadowed 
Morgenthau’s later public pronouncements, providing the basis for his later (apparent) 
political shift. For Morgenthau, the first principle of realism was the recognition that 
politics was governed by objective laws which had their roots in human nature and that in 
order to improve society it was first necessary to understand these laws. One of these 
laws, constituting the second principle of realism, was that statesmen think and act “in 
terms of interest defined as power.” According to this perspective, Morgenthau believed 
it futile to be concerned with either the motive or political sympathies of the individual 
statesman. As proof of the former he drew upon the example of Neville Chamberlain 
who, despite having as his objective the morally virtuous goal of preserving peace, in fact 
instituted policies which made the Second World War “inevitable.” By contrast, 
suggested Morgenthau, the motives of Winston Churchill had been “much less universal 
in scope and much more narrowly directed toward personal and national power,” yet his 
resultant policies were far superior. Likewise denying the importance of political 
preference, Morgenthau argued that statesmen must choose between what they might 
consider desirable, and what was possible “under the concrete circumstances of time and 
place.” 
The third principle of realism acknowledged that while the dominant force for any 
individual or nation state was the pursuit of its own interests, the nature of the power 
employed or sought would vary according to the “political and cultural environment.” 
Applying this analysis to the division of power or interests between states, Morgenthau 
made it clear, perhaps particularly so to those he perceived as having mis-understood his 
theories, that “nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the 
present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of 
a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral 
requirements of the contemporary world.” Where realism differed from “other schools of 
thought,” however, was the recognition that this transformation would come about only 
as a result of manipulating “the perennial forces that have shaped the past” rather than by 
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“confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to 
take those laws into account.” With these words Morgenthau made his position with 
regards to the United Nations quite clear. He had acknowledged in the Preface that the 
first edition of Politics had offered a somewhat pessimistic view of the UN’s potential but 
here he took the opportunity to clarify that though pessimistic about the likelihood of 
change stemming from an idealist understanding of international relations, realism did 
contain within it the possibility for transformation from a world of nation states to one of 
supranational institutions so long as the shift was accomplished on the basis of states’ real 
interests. Thus again, Morgenthau’s reasoning illustrates the progressive and liberatory 
potential within realism.  
Morgenthau’s fourth principle focused on the question of morality, arguing that 
“universal moral principles” could not be applied as abstract formulations but only when 
“filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.” Thus, a nation state must 
act according to what would likely preserve its national interests not according to an 
abstract idea of morality. The fifth principle of realism articulated by Morgenthau 
proclaimed that while states will inevitably pursue what they perceive to be their national 
interests, they should not think that in so doing, they always have God on their side. 
Morgenthau issued particular warning against the “crusading frenzy” which blinding a 
nation to its true interests, could lead to the nation’s destruction. The distinction drawn by 
Morgenthau here between the reality that states will always pursue their own interests 
and the idea that states are always right is a fine one but one that is critical to an 
understanding of realist thought. Equally important is the recognition that the very basis 
given by Morgenthau for avoiding a “crusading frenzy” is less the moral consequences of 
believing itself to be right and far more the political consequences that it would likely be 
to the detriment of the state. Thus realism, even as it acknowledges the limits of what 
states should do does so on the basis of what is best for the state. Again, it is from within 
this rationale – hinted at in1948 but articulated here more clearly in this Second Edition 
in1953 - that Morgenthau will later criticize U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  
The final principle of realism asserted that whilst acknowledging the existence of 
other spheres, a political realist must always judge a course of action not by its effects 
upon those spheres but by its effects upon the power of the state. By way of illustration, 
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Morgenthau detailed three historical examples, and in so doing highlighted the very heart 
of realist thought. Weighing up whether Britain and France should have intervened when 
Russia invaded Finland, Morgenthau had no doubt that the answer to the legal question 
was in the affirmative: Russia had violated a treaty and ought, according to the legalist 
framework, be brought to book. According to a realist interpretation, however, France 
and Britain were better not to have intervened since to have done so would have put them 
at war with both Russia and Germany – a situation inimical to the interests of either state. 
Analyzing the question of the recognition of China and the decision by Britain to 
intervene following Germany’s invasion of Belgium in 1914 in much the same light, 
Morgenthau used the events of history to emphasize what he perceived to be the core of 
realist thought: that whatever other influences might be stake, realism dictated a focus 
upon the power and interests of the state first and foremost.  
Seven years later, in 1960, Morgenthau again revisited the theory and practice of 
realism as he published the third edition of Politics Among Nations.114 While he claimed 
in his preface that “assumptions, tenets, and theoretical structure” had been left intact, in 
fact, the book, as had its predecessor five years before, included a number of innovative 
applications. Morgenthau placed much greater emphasis upon the existence of “an 
objective and universally valid truth about matters political” which was “accessible to 
human reason.” Even as he argued for universal truth, however, Morgenthau emphasized 
that its nature and form would change according to “the ever changing configurations of 
successive periods of history.”115 In short, it would appear in different forms at different 
times. Thus to English people of the nineteenth century, a time when Great Britain was 
the workshop of the world, the notion of the balance of power as consisting of several 
states weighing themselves and their desires and actions against each other, each kept in 
check by the weight of the others, was both commonly and easily understood. By 
contrast, the United States currently operated within a bi-polar international system. 
Critical to Morgenthau’s insight was his argument that while the two systems of 
international relations appeared superficially quite different, the earlier multi-polar, the 
later bi-polar, in fact the underlying principles behind each were identical. Each system 
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was governed by a balance of power as participating states, in pursuit of their national 
interest, kept the other(s) in check.  
Morgenthau used his Third Edition as a means of condemning those whom he 
perceived to have mis-understood or mis-applied his earlier work. He had first touched 
upon this issue five years earlier but now, in 1960, made his displeasure yet clearer. In 
particular, he railed against the allegation that he believed “in the prominence of the 
international system based upon the nation state.” Such a charge was especially unfair, 
claimed Morgenthau, when “the obsolescence of the nation state and the need to merge it 
into supranational organizations of a functional nature was already one of the main points 
of the first edition of 1948.” 116 Thus Morgenthau took the opportunity to remind readers 
that contrary to popular understandings of his work which fixated upon his assessment of 
the key role of the nation state, he was, and had always been, concerned with the 
possibility that such states might one day concede power to a supranational body. 
Morgenthau also rejected the accusation that he had made “success the standard of 
political action” or that he was “indifferent” to the “moral problem,” again directing 
readers to the substance of his earlier work as proof. 117  
In addition to condemning those who had mis-understood his own work, 
Morgenthau took the opportunity of this third Preface to criticize policymakers who 
equated power with “material strength, especially of a military nature.”118According to 
Morgenthau, there was a great deal more to international diplomacy than building up 
one’s arms supply. Morgenthau focused upon the growing militaries perhaps in part 
because of what he perceived to be an entirely new feature of the post-45 age – the 
obsolescence of all-out violence as an instrument of foreign policy. In short, the likely 
mutual destruction that any nuclear war would create made any use of nuclear power, or 
all-out violence, unlikely. Thus, contrary to the basic theories of realism, states would not 
employ all the power available to them in pursuit of their interests because to do so would 
be to jeopardize the greatest self-interest of all, survival. Again, it is against this context 
that Morgenthau’s later condemnation of U.S., military involvement in Vietnam should 
be placed.  
                                                 
116 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition, 1960, Preface. 
117 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition, 1960, Preface. 
118 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition, 1960, Preface. 
 45
A decade after the appearance of this Third Edition, the U.S. Government, 
frustrated by the continued survival of the Viet Cong, and indeed North Vietnam, had 
turned to a policy of massive military engagement, throwing thousands of tons of bombs 
at its opponents, confident (rather like the generals of the Western Front in the First 
World War) that the breakthrough would surely come if only they threw enough 
firepower at the enemy. According to Morgenthau’s proscription, no such break-through 
would come. Indeed it could not do so since from the realist perspective of Morgenthau, 
U.S. policymakers had become so fixated on the acquisition of material and military 
strength as a means to power that they were neglecting other, equally integral aspects of 
the system of international relations. That Morgenthau’s critique was not merely a moral 
critique but one framed within a realist perspective is manifest in his warning that in 
neglecting the vital interests of other states, in this case North Vietnam, U.S. 
policymakers were risking the interests of the United States. As Morgenthau himself put 
it “ … if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their 
respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of  them. 
We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this 
fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other 
nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot 
fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment”119  
Morgenthau waited nine years before publishing the Fourth Edition of Politics 
Among Nations.120 As before, he refined his concepts and theoretical propositions and 
added new material to address new situations. In 1967, the primary new situation was the 
changed configuration of the United Nations, particularly the new election and voting 
procedures for both the Security and Economic and Social Councils. As he had done in 
previous editions, Morgenthau also took the opportunity to engage his academic 
colleagues – or perhaps more accurately to explain his refusal to engage. Referring to 
criticism leveled against him for failing to defend his theories against currently 
fashionable ideas within International Relations theory such as systems analysis or 
simulation, Morgenthau argued that academic disputes about methodology were likely to 
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achieve little and indeed were most likely to obscure political truths. Despite this 
seemingly disinterested stance, however, Morgenthau in fact did engage with the theories 
of his colleagues. Referring to the plethora of theories available, for example, he made 
clear that “a theory must be judged not by its epistemological pretenses and 
methodological innovations” but by “the contribution that it makes to our knowledge and 
understanding of phenomena which are worth knowing.”121 Thus Morgenthau made clear 
that in his opinion the theories with which he was supposed to engage were unworthy of 
his time since, no matter how sophisticated they appeared, they would likely make little 
contribution to knowledge. 
It was another nine years before Morgenthau published the Fifth Edition of his 
book, during which period, according to Morgenthau, international politics had witnessed 
the most significant changes since the end of World War II.122 Morgenthau focused 
particularly in this edition upon the consequences of the Vietnam War, and the explicit 
recognition by the West of the territorial status quo in Europe, a recognition which, for 
Morgenthau, symbolized the effective end of the Cold War. The arena of International 
Politics had also changed substantially with the entry of China as a would-be third 
superpower and the coming of age of the defeated Axis powers, Japan and Germany, as 
independent, democratic nation states. Further complicating global politics, however, was 
the fact that the United Nations, the apparent success of which only twenty years before 
had caused Morgenthau to revise his initial proscriptions, had now declined as a force in 
international politics.  
In light of Morgenthau’s public protestations over the Vietnam War by 1973, it is 
hardly surprising that he took the opportunity provided by a fifth edition to analyze the 
consequences of the war for both U.S. power, and international politics more generally. 
Inserting an analysis of the war into his core principles of realism, Morgenthau suggested 
that U.S. conduct in Indo-China provided the tools with which to construct “a counter-
theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics.” Morgenthau 
articulated an in-depth critique of the policy makers whom he believed responsible for 
U.S. policy. They had replaced experience with superstition; refused to correct their 
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“picture of the world” in the light of subsequent experience; used intelligence not as a 
tool with which to adapt policy to reality but as a means of reinterpreting reality to accord 
with policy; allowed their egoism to widen the gap between perception and reality; and 
used action, “any kind of action,” as a means of closing the gap between perception and 
reality. Whilst the specifics of Morgenthau’s denunciation were new to the Fifth Edition, 
the argument on which they were based was not; it rested on the same core six principles 
of realism as had his earlier analyses of the Winter War, World War I, and the 
recognition of China. As he had done all along, however, Morgenthau applied his core 
thinking to new situations, and where necessary, expanded the range of analytical tools 
available to his readers. Thus, as a means of helping students of International Relations 
make sense of the Vietnam War, Morgenthau not only inserted an analysis of the war into 
his core principles but also expanded his analysis of political prediction and included a 
systemic emphasis upon the factor of irrationality in the conduct of foreign policy.  
As he had made clear in previous editions, so here did Morgenthau emphasize that 
while all of the changes to which he referred were significant, and while they all played 
some part in shaping a new tapestry of international relations, still his theories, the same 
theories as first expounded twenty-five years before, were relevant tools of analysis.123 
While on the one hand this assertion might be seen as a statement of self-confidence, 
almost arrogance, it also reflected Morgenthau’s conviction that the substance of his 
arguments had not changed, even as the political circumstances to which they could be 
applied had. Thus again it becomes obvious that, from Morgenthau’s perspective his 
criticism of the Vietnam War was a logical development within the original parameters of 
realism as first put forward two and a half decades before.    
Five years later in 1978 a Revised Fifth Edition of Politics Among Nations 
appeared, the last to be personally supervised by the then 74 year old Morgenthau.124 As 
before, perhaps the most prominent statement by Morgenthau concerned the continuing 
relevancy of his work. Indeed, more than this, he celebrated the foresight shown in 
previous editions by suggesting that “many recent developments in foreign policy” had 
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been “anticipated by the theoretical considerations contained in previous editions…” 125 
Thus according to Morgenthau, realism, or at least his realism, was not only still a 
relevant analytical tool but had proved capable of predicting or at least suggesting 
possibilities for the future within international relations which could not have been 
known at the time. The consistency of the intellectual foundations of the revised fifth 
edition of 1978 with the previous editions is quite remarkable. As a result, although the 
effect of the application of his principals may have varied, Morgenthau’s loyalty to these 
intellectual foundations remained unaltered. Thus he remained constant in his conviction 
that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” and that whenever 
policy makers “strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so 
by striving for power.”126  
The analysis Morgenthau offered the reader in 1978 of the elements of the power 
of a country - geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, 
population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality 
of government - were the same as those he had offered the reader of the first edition in 
1948.127 His outline of his theme was as constant as the morning star, from the robust and 
nuanced realism of Parts One through Eight, to his aspiration towards the possibility of a 
world state in part nine. His aspirations for a more hopeful future focused, as always, on 
the possibility, if not the probability of human moral transformation. He hoped, as he had 
always done, for the possibility of a global civil society as the basis of a world state: 
“What is needed [for permanent peace] is a radical transformation of the existing 
international society of sovereign nations into a supranational community of 
individuals.”128 
With this edition, as he had done in his career progression, Morgenthau had come 
full circle professionally. He had achieved fame in 1948 with the publication of the first 
edition of what would prove to be his masterpiece. He had sustained his renown by 
publishing updates of this work over the course of the next thirty years. With each edition 
he had acknowledged the most critical changes in the international sphere while at the 
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same time making clear the continuing relevancy, through its adaptability, of his core 
argument. Furthermore, his confidence in the constancy of his work enabled him to offer 
critiques of contemporary U.S. foreign policy without losing faith in his own theories. In 
essence, Morgenthau, through his critiques and analysis, made clear that realism, as 
articulated by him over the course of the post-war period, contained within it both 
conservative and progressive elements and thus consisted of a theoretical consistency 
combined with a practical flexibility. Morgenthau’s intellectual consistency was reflected 
throughout the successive editions of Politics Among Nations. It was also evident in his 
other monographs, monographs to which we now turn. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Five Monographs: Morgenthau’s Approach Applied 
 
 
 
If Politics Among Nations was Morgenthau’s singular masterpiece, he also 
published a significant collection of other monographs, which taken together, might be 
seen to match Politics both in terms of substantive argument, and as a reflection of the 
constancy combined with flexibility which was the hallmark of Morgenthau’s realism. In 
this chapter I have chosen to focus on five such texts, all of which, I suggest, reflect a 
particular aspect of Morgenthau’s intellectual development as applied to changing 
international circumstances. 
Morgenthau’s first published monograph was Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 
published in 1946.129 In this text Morgenthau offered a critique of positivist methods in 
the context of a blunter analysis of the consequences of relying on an idealist framework 
in international relations than would be presented even in Politics Among Nations. Here 
he offered no hopes of how peace might one day be achieved through the formation of 
effective supranational institutions. Instead, he concentrated his fire upon the futility of 
attempting to apply the analysis of the laboratory to the political collective. Morgenthau 
accused “scientific man” of trying to understand international society according to a set 
of rational rules by which everyone would abide. For Morgenthau international society 
was not so easily ruled. Humanity was a great deal too complex to be the subject of 
scientific rational planning and analysis. Rather what was required was the application of 
judgment and experience.  
Applying his theory to the international arena of the twentieth century, 
Morgenthau proposed that the problems of the inter-war era had arisen not because, as 
idealists would have it, there had been too little reason applied, but because states as a 
natural course of order, recognize no legal authority upon them. Certainly there might 
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exist moral strictures or an international law in name, but, argued Morgenthau, an 
international law without the possibility of sanction was really no international law at all. 
Thus, if one wanted to understand the events of the inter-war era, one would do better to 
examine the reality of states’ interests, rather than the looked-for hopes of reason and 
morality. Thus Wilsonian idealism had offered not a realistic means of understanding 
international politics but rather a false hope. A realistic, or in Morgenthau’s terms, a 
realist, analysis based on judgment and experience would have recognized that states 
were interested only in the pursuit of power, in which pursuit they would be governed 
only according to the perceived national interests of the state.  
In 1951, Morgenthau applied his theory of realism to U.S. foreign policy. Thus In 
Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, 
examined U.S. diplomacy past and present.130 According to Morgenthau, U.S. foreign 
policy could be broken down into four stages, or eras. The first, represented by George 
Washington, perhaps most obviously in his Farewell Address, was an age of realism 
when policymakers clearly understood and acted upon what they perceived to be the real 
interests of the United States. The nineteenth century, according to Morgenthau, 
witnessed an ideological era when the national interests of the United States were co-
terminous with contemporary notions of morality. Though dangerous ground, this 
philosophy worked well enough because at heart policymakers still pursued the real 
interests of the country. The real damage, according to Morgenthau, had happened in the 
last fifty years when policymakers had conducted foreign policy according to a utopian or 
idealistic conception of the world.  
Thus, here again, as he had done in Scientific Man and in Politics Among Nations, 
and as he would do throughout his professional career, Morgenthau reserved his greatest 
disdain for idealism with, as a mechanism for understanding international relations, its 
belief in the limits imposed upon the freedom of nation states’ behavior by international 
institutions and mores. This belief, argued Morgenthau, was best represented by such 
theories and practices as Wilsonian diplomacy, Dunbarton legalism, Trumanian 
sentimentalism, and neo-isolation. Collectively these errors had caused U.S. policy to 
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stray from its proper course. The result, in the post-war age, was that what should have 
been a realist age had been perverted. Morgenthau now called upon policymakers to 
abandon these errors and revert to the realism of Washington. Specifically, he urged that 
contemporary U.S. foreign policy should be guided by the objective of securing a balance 
of power in Europe and Asia, and by maintaining a dominant position for the United 
States within its own hemisphere. Even more succinctly, he argued that national interests 
should be yardstick against which all foreign policy decisions should be measured. 
Just over a decade later, with three editions of Politics Among Nations under his 
belt, Morgenthau again applied the more general theories contained within his 
masterpiece to the particular needs of his adopted country. In Politics, Morgenthau had 
urged both theorists and policymakers to theorize and act according to the situation as it 
actually was, not according to how they thought it should be, or hoped it might one day 
become, and above all else, to focus on the national interest. Examining U.S. policy in 
1962 in The Purpose of American Politics, Morgenthau argued that while not all states 
had a national interest, the absence of which explained their relative lack of influence in 
the world, for the United States the national interest was an amalgam of equality and 
liberty. It was this creative tension that existed between equality and liberty - the national 
purpose - that gave a normative nature to the outcome sought by U.S. foreign policy. 
Having asserted the centrality of national interest, Morgenthau in American Politics was 
ready to follow the same rule – even at the cost of apparently contradicting his earlier 
arguments.131 As elsewhere, however, a close reading of Morgenthau’s argument reveals 
not an inconsistency with earlier thought but rather a flexibility, an ability to adapt an 
existing theory to a new situation sufficiently well that the original theory, might at first 
glance appear to have been overruled. In fact, it is still very much present.  
The new situation that ‘actually was’ in 1962, according to Morgenthau, was the 
combined existence of nuclear weapons and the advanced rockets and guidance systems 
designed to carry the weapons from continent to continent. The result was that America 
could no longer secure its borders exclusively through its own efforts. No matter how 
much material strength the U.S. amassed, it could not prevent an attack of such 
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magnitude as would likely destroy the nation. Thus where once Morgenthau had doubted 
the utility of supranational bodies, now he saw them as the only possible mechanism by 
which new weapons of mass destruction could be controlled. True to his earlier analysis, 
Morgenthau in 1962 did not suggest that a strong United Nations or some other such 
institution, was a guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used, only that it was the 
best method of potential control available. As he phrased it, “The United States must 
choose not between insecurity and security, but between utter insecurity and a measure of 
insecurity which, in view of the alternative, is tolerable.”132   
While it would be possible to read American Politics as a shift to the left for 
Morgenthau, and his call for a stronger supranational body as proof of his growing 
disenchantment with the politics of power between nations, it would be more appropriate 
to see in it a constancy of purpose, a call for nation states to act in a manner which would 
best serve their self-interests. Thus, believed Morgenthau, if every nation state signed up, 
it would make the supranational body all the stronger, and all the more likely to be able to 
impose its will upon constituent members, and thereby assure both the collective and 
individual security of those same members. From this perspective, the conceding of 
national sovereignty, was not, as might superficially be assumed, against the interests of 
nation states but rather very much integral to them. 
If in American Politics Morgenthau applied his realist framework to an overview 
of U.S. foreign policy, in Vietnam and The United States, he concentrated his analysis 
upon what was in 1965, the year of the book’s publication, possibly the ‘hottest’ single 
issue in U.S. foreign policy.133 Although the book could be perceived as being what 
would be termed today ‘an instant book,’ written in response to a particular set of 
circumstances of the moment, its analyses and arguments reflected years of scholarly 
research and reflection. As we have seen, Morgenthau’s analysis of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam represented not an aberration of the realist conception of international relations 
produced in1948, but rather its practical application to a new set of circumstances. 
Consisting of previously published essays drawn from Morgenthau’s contribution to the 
mass media between 1956 and 1965, along with an original introductory essay written for 
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the occasion, Vietnam and The United States, summarized and foregrounded 
Morgenthau’s thoughts about U.S. policy and Vietnam. 
Essentially Morgenthau proposed that U.S. policy toward Vietnam was based on 
three myths: “a binding commitment to the Saigon government that engages our ‘honor’; 
aggression from the North against a people anxious to have us defend their national 
independence; and the identity of the interests and policies of the Viet Cong, North 
Vietnam and China.”134 According to Morgenthau, since none of the propositions behind 
these ideas was true, the U.S. policy which had resulted from them was also false, i.e. a 
policy not in the true interests of the United States. Instead, what had resulted was a 
policy which could result only in the “…indiscriminate killing of everybody in sight – by 
genocide.”135 Morgenthau’s use in an academic monograph of language more likely to be 
heard on the streets, or on the campuses of student-dominated universities might, as 
before, suggest a shift to the left. Again, however, a contextualized reading of his 
argument makes clear that this is not the case. Morgenthau argued against genocide not 
on moral grounds but because the policy from which it would result was flawed, flawed 
in the sense of not serving the interests of the United States. From this perspective, as 
elsewhere, Morgenthau’s realism may be seen to contain within it a liberatory potential 
since it recognized that the “…indiscriminate killing of everybody in sight” was hardly 
good or useful politics. 
In the second edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau had introduced the 
element of “quality of government” as an aspect of international politics. We have 
already discussed his later use of this dimension in reference to the Johnson 
administration and its harassment of him through the arms of government. In Vietnam 
and The United States, Morgenthau employed the same analytical tool to serve a 
blistering attack upon the individuals within government he perceived to be responsible 
for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He accused these policymakers of being unable to 
distinguish between what was good for the country and what was good for their own 
reputations. His analysis is worth quoting in some detail since it manifests the anger 
Morgenthau clearly felt when he considered the Vietnam War. As he saw it,  
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“disastrous policies consistently pursued serve the self-protection 
of those who have initiated or inherited them. We are here in the 
presence of an issue not of foreign policy or military strategy but 
of psychopathology. The result is the personalization of the fear of 
the loss of prestige, so that in the end it is not only the prestige of 
the nation that is at stake, but the prestige of the policymaker 
himself, his ability to retain his power, and his place in history. 
The commitment which the policymaker feels he cannot escape is 
not so much to the government of South Vietnam as to the public 
opinion of the United States.”136 
 
As with his use of the term ‘genocide,” Morgenthau with this critique placed 
himself squarely on the side of those who would later ask President Johnson how many 
kids had “he killed today.”137 Although the desired ends were the same, however, there 
was a difference between Morgenthau and most street activists. Morgenthau called for an 
end to the war not because it was the morally right thing to do, or because the United 
States should abandon its interests in the region and concede to the force of popular will 
or compassion. Rather, the United States should withdraw from Vietnam because the 
country’s involvement was a result not of real or actual U.S. interests but because of the 
interests of particular office-holders who were intent on putting their interests ahead of 
the interests of the country. The extent of Morgenthau’s disdain for the Johnson 
administration is clear when one realizes that he condemned the policymakers not for 
having implemented bad policies in good faith but for continuing to implement bad 
policies for bad reasons. Thus, the fact that the vitriol contained within Morgenthau’s 
assessment of particular members of the U.S. policy-making establishment matched that 
launched by left-wing activists who sought both the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam 
and the downfall of the current U.S. administration does not mean that Morgenthau was 
himself a left wing activist. At times, one might walk like a duck, talk like a duck but still 
be very much a realist conservative, albeit a conservative whose framework contained 
within it the potential for liberation and progressivism.  
Reflecting on his experiences toward the end of his career, Morgenthau produced 
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his last work, A New Foreign Policy for the United States in 1969.138 The very title of the 
book might well be seen to reflect a shift in Morgenthau’s thinking. As one credited with 
formulating the basis on which so much of post-45 U.S. foreign policy had been built, if 
Morgenthau was now calling for ‘a new foreign policy’, then surely he must be rejecting 
the old, or more specifically his old. In fact, he was, as ever, developing and applying his 
existing policy to the new circumstances of the late 1960s. Doing so would mean a 
change in the actual foreign policy as currently practiced by the United States, but it 
would not change the fundamental grounds on which such policies would be based. That 
basis was the same in 1969 as it had been in 1949 – the pursuit and preservation of U.S. 
national security and power.  
Arguing that the United States must most urgently decide what was essential for 
its national well-being and reject what was peripheral and contingent, Morgenthau argued 
for a ruthless prioritization so as best to promote the national interests of the United 
States. In essence, rejecting both isolationism and globalism, Morgenthau called for new 
policies for a new world. Reiterating his conviction that there was no such thing as a 
monolithic communist world, Morgenthau emphasized that in interfering in countries 
where it had no business to be, the United States was acting against its own best interests. 
Instead, Morgenthau laid out a new vision of foreign policy. Based as ever on the pursuit 
of U.S. national interests, this policy should, according to Morgenthau, avoid an arms 
race, conduct nuclear policy at the international level, recognize China and form a new 
Atlantic alliance with Western Europe. In short, the United States should decide where its 
national interests lay and implement policies exclusively in those regions, neglecting 
areas of no particular concern to the U.S. As harsh as the proposal might have sounded, 
or indeed as ‘soft’ as it might have sounded given its general advice to withdraw from 
Vietnam, the underlying message was the same as it had always been – find, and secure, 
the interests of the state.  
Perhaps of most obvious dramatic significance, Morgenthau, in A New Foreign 
Policy, called for an end to the policy of containment. Arguing that it had been valuable 
“during the famous fifteen weeks of the spring of 1947” when the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan had together represented the implementation of the then innovative 
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policy of containment, Morgenthau now proclaimed it to be an outdated, and with 
particular regard to China, dangerous policy. Attempting to contain China, claimed 
Morgenthau, would likely lead to a serious military engagement. Far better to engage 
diplomatically, recognizing the realities of the situation - China was the dominant power 
in its hemisphere, was already becoming an economic and political competitor to the 
United States, and was in any case, practicing a communism different in substance from, 
and certainly not allied with, that practiced in the Soviet Union.  
Thus by the time of his final new monograph, Morgenthau had, as he had done in 
other spheres, come full circle. Having become famous on the basis of the doctrine of 
containment, certainly justified and popularized by him if first articulated by Kennan, he 
was now calling for its rejection. He did so, however, not because he believed realism to 
have outrun its course, but because he perceived that realism had already been abandoned 
by U.S. policymakers and needed very much to be brought back. It was a position 
articulated in successive editions of Politics Among Nations, in a representative sampling 
of his monographs and also through his contributions to edited collections and his 
published articles in academic journals. It is to these that we now turn. 
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Chapter Four 
 
From Germany to Nuclear Weapons: Realism in Practice 
 
 
 
Whilst Morgenthau’s monographs represent important statements of his thought, 
he also contributed to academic debate, and helped shape the parameters of the 
discussion, through the writing of peer-reviewed articles, book chapters, and essays.139 In 
this chapter I have chosen to analyze three articles and one book chapter as a means of 
understanding Morgenthau’s politics of realism. Taken together, and building on the 
suggestions already made through a reading of his seminal work and other monographs, I 
propose that here, as elsewhere, what is apparent is the flexible fixity of Morgenthau’s 
thought.  
In the summer of 1950, the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation Annual 
Institute was held at the University of Chicago. These annual institutes which had been 
established in 1924 were the occasion of bringing various outside speakers to Chicago in 
order to discuss a common theme of topical importance. With the establishment of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, it seemed timely that the 1950 Institute should 
discuss Germany and the future of Europe, and that the editor of that year’s volume 
should be Hans J. Morgenthau. In addition to editing the published collection, 
Morgenthau was also responsible for contributing a chapter of his own, “Germany and 
the Future of Europe,” dealing with the question of how the political interests of Western 
Europe might be reconciled with the rebirth of an independent Germany.140 The 
significance of this question to post-war Europe cannot easily be overemphasized. If 
Europe of the 1870s had been bothered by the German question in the shape of how to 
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cope with a newly united Germany, then the Europe of the 1950s was plagued by the 
German question in the shape of how to deal with a divided Germany, and in particular 
how to respond to a West Germany which though territorially much reduced in size was 
still a major economic and political power to be reckoned with.  
With the decision by the United States to actively engage in a process of 
containment of the Soviet Union, West Germany was the frontline state with the Soviet 
sphere of influence. By choosing to examine the issue of Germany, Morgenthau was in 
many ways looking at the central problem of the early Cold War. For Morgenthau there 
were three key problems to be dealt with when examining Germany. Firstly, to prevent a 
rebirth of the worldview that led firstly Prussia, then a united Wilhemite Germany, and 
then Hitler’s Reich into war. Secondly, how, whilst making sure that Germany would not 
again be a threat to its neighbors, it would yet be an economically powerful and 
politically stable state.  And finally, how this economically powerful and politically 
stable German state would be able to protect itself against Finland-style domination by 
the Soviet Union. At the same time as he sought to avoid German domination, however, 
Morgenthau believed that Germany had to be sufficiently strong so as to serve as a buffer 
against communism. Indeed, Morgenthau believed that a strong Germany was essential to 
the success of anti-communism efforts. In essence, Morgenthau sought to engage with the 
issue of how a rearmed Germany could be prevented from dominating its neighbors to the 
detriment of the interests of the Western Allies while still being allowed to grow 
sufficiently strong as to protect them.141 
Even as Morgenthau was offering solutions to Europe’s, and in light of the global 
nature of international relations in 1950, the world’s German question, he was also 
identifying what he perceived to be the origins of recent errors in U.S. foreign policy. 
According to “The Mainspring of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. 
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Moral Abstraction,” published in 1950 in The American Political Science Review, the 
premier journal in the field, the error lay in the original claim of early colonists of the 
would-be United States that their society was fundamentally different from Europe.  
Specifically, according to Morgenthau, they claimed that their society was the antithesis 
of Europe rather than, through its imperialistic nature, its culmination. It was only, 
claimed Morgenthau, because the indigenous inhabitants of the North American 
landmass were so inferior in terms of numbers, organization and military capability that 
the apologists and politicians of the European settlers were able to make the argument 
that the political expansion of the original thirteen colonies into the interior was an act 
“…of civilization rather than conquest” and as such essentially differed from, and was 
morally superior to, the imperialist ventures, wars of conquest, and colonial acquisitions 
with which the history of other nations was replete.142   
As a result of this deception, claimed Morgenthau, the American public believed 
itself to be morally superior to Europe. With this belief, cloaking the expansion of the 
country in a civilizationist framework, they were denying the reality of the power politics 
by which the expansion had actually been achieved. This denial of power politics and the 
accompanying perception that politics was in fact guided by moral impulses such as the 
civilizational impulse which had sponsored expansion into the interior, had, claimed 
Morgenthau, led directly to the disaster of Wilsonian idealism. Morgenthau believed now 
that the only way forward was for U.S. policymakers to acknowledge the reality of what 
had actually made the United States such a strong country and to deny the myth of what 
people believed had made them strong. To do so would be to correct the basis on which 
future foreign policies could be established, an essential prerequisite for future success 
since it stood to reason that a policy built upon false assumptions, as had been the case 
with idealism, could reap only false rewards, or at least rewards antithical to the real 
interests of the United States.  
Likewise antithical, according to Morgenthau was the granting of aid to other 
nations on grounds unrelated to U.S. national interests. “Preface to a Political Theory of 
Foreign Aid,” published in The American Political Science Review in 1962, might in 
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some ways be considered Morgenthau’s most controversial article since it appears to be 
absent any sense of compassion. It is certainly one that weakens any perception of 
Morgenthau as a liberal. And yet, it is no different, no less realist, no less progressive 
than his other work.143 For Morgenthau compassion in foreign policy was misplaced. To 
implement foreign policy according to a compassionate view of the world would be to 
implement foreign policy according to how one wanted, or wished, the world to look. To 
act according to these guidelines would be to return to the idealism of the inter-war age, 
an idealism which, according to Morgenthau, had clearly not worked out, and which had 
been obviously discredited. As Morgenthau saw it, cloaking foreign aid in idealism had 
clouded the minds of both policymakers and the public about what aid should really be 
concerned with. It was not, argued Morgenthau, about charity or help. Nor was it purely 
an economic transaction. It was an expression of the relationship between economy and 
politics and was directly tied to the securing of the interests of the United States. These 
interests, according to Morgenthau, did not include apparently random, or at least 
indiscriminate giving of aid to underdeveloped nations so that they might develop.  
Perhaps somewhat harshly, but expressive of a realist viewpoint, Morgenthau 
suggested that some nations suffered “…from human deficiencies which preclude 
economic development” or “to put it bluntly: as there are bums and beggars so there are 
bum and beggar nations.” To give such nations aid would be ludicrous, since “short of a 
miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character, what they receive 
from the outside is not likely to be used for economic development.” Further lambasting 
the political structures within such nations, Morgenthau believed that in many aid-
recipient nations, “peace and order” were maintained “only through the ruthless use of 
the monopoly of violence by the ruling group.” Thus while the giving of aid might well 
prompt democratic forces to start a revolution, it could not control the outcome and thus 
revolution would likely lead not to democracy but to chaos and disorder. Hence for 
Morgenthau, any attempt by the United States to stimulate economic development or 
industrialization as a route to political democracy would, by disrupting “the social fabric 
of the underdeveloped nation” more likely lead to a revolution, the outcome of which 
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would be unlikely to benefit the United States. Instead of this idealist path, the U.S. 
would do better to determine its aid recipients according to its friendships - a harsh 
proscription perhaps but one that would be more palatable, at least within the domestic 
sphere of U.S. politics, if the idealism under which aid was currently cloaked was 
abandoned and the public taught to see aid for what it really a was, as another dimension 
of international relations.  
In Politics Among Nations Morgenthau had articulated the hope that the 
international political order could eventually create a mechanism for the enforcement of 
international peace. In 1963, “The Political Conditions for an International Police Force,” 
published in a special issue of International Organization, he looked specifically at the 
likelihood that such a peace could be maintained by an international police force. 144 
Arguing that the political conditions for international peace would be in place when 
nation states were willing to surrender real aspects of their sovereignty to a supranational 
body, Morgenthau declared that that time had clearly not yet come. Thus he had reached 
the conclusion that in a world of sovereign nations, the idea of a reliable and effective 
police force was a contradiction in terms. 
According to Morgenthau, an international police force, by dint of being 
international could not be more reliable or efficient than the political interests and 
military capabilities of the nations supporting it allowed it to be. Furthermore, the loyalty 
of the individuals within the international police force would always lie first with their 
own nation state. Taking as his example the attitude of the police during the forced 
integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962, Morgenthau argued that “the 
political preferences of the police are likely to color the performance of its functions.”145 
Thus in order to be effective, a supranational body would have to create its own force 
rather than relying on the borrowed forces of nation states. In effect, Morgenthau was 
                                                 
144 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Political Conditions for an International Police Force,” International 
Organization, Volume 17, Issue 2 International Force : A Symposium (Spring ,1963), 393-403. 
145 Morgenthau, “The Political Conditions for an International Police Force,” p.394. What Morgenthau 
found to be true of Mississippi in1962 would also prove to be true of Northern Ireland in 1968, a year 
infamous for the obvious preference of the police force for the Protestant cause against the nationalist at the 
outbreak of what would come to be known as ‘The Troubles.” For a through evaluation of the role of the 
police in Northern Ireland see, Aogan Mulcahy, Policing Northern Ireland: Legitimacy, Reform and Social 
Conflict (Cullompton : Willan Publishing, 2004); and Chris Ryder, The RUC: A Force Under Fire, 
(London:  ~ Methuen Publishing, 1989). 
 
 63
following the advice offered many years earlier by Lenin that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat could not merely take over the instruments of the Tsarist state and use them 
for its own purposes since instruments designed for one purpose cannot readily be used 
for another. Thus just as Lenin held that the proletariat had to create institutions of its 
own, so too did Morgenthau hold that a supranational institution must create its own 
police force.  
Significantly, and suggestive of the progressivism inherent within his realist 
framework, Morgenthau suggested that the creation of just such a force was a real 
possibility - “in a totally disarmed world.” According to Morgenthau, an environment of 
total disarmament would create, or be created by, a supranational authority rendering the 
international sphere to be no longer anarchic. In other words, “total disarmament and 
world government go hand in hand…”146  With this article Morgenthau appeared to offer 
something to all sides. On the one hand, a dismissal of the likely effectiveness of any 
international police force - a clear string for the right; on the other, the expression of hope 
that one day total disarmament and world government would govern international 
relations - a clear string for the left. In reality, Morgenthau was pulling politically for 
neither side. He was simply, as he had been doing since 1946, applying the essentials of 
his realism - that nation states sought, maintained and used power according to perceived 
national self-interest - to the perplexing question of whether or not, or at what point in 
time or circumstances, an international police would or could become a viable reality.  
One of the most chilling aspects of the Cold War for many ordinary citizens must 
surely have been the knowledge that the destruction of their country, and perhaps the 
world as they knew it, was always only a few minutes away. In this respect, Morgenthau 
was no different from his fellows. Analyzing the influence of nuclear weapons upon 
international relations in “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” published in The 
American Political Science Review in 1964, Morgenthau proposed that the transition 
from pre-nuclear to nuclear age was as significant as that from antiquity to medieval and 
medieval to modern.147 The existence of nuclear weapons was made yet more 
complicated by the four paradoxes of Morgenthau’s title. First, the impossibility of the 
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use of nuclear weapons because of the fear of their destructive capability, whilst still 
holding a commitment to use these same weapons. Second, the desire for the creation of a 
viable nuclear strategy which was sufficiently complex so as to avoid ever having to use 
nuclear weapons. Third, the conflict between seeking to prevent a nuclear arms race 
whilst continuing to develop ever more powerful nuclear weapons. And finally, the desire 
by the United States to create an international alliance system to protect its interests, even 
as there existed rockets to carry hydrogen bombs from continent to continent which, for 
Morgenthau, made such an alliance structure obsolete. In essence, Morgenthau suggested 
“all these paradoxes result from the contrast between traditional attitudes and the 
possibility of nuclear war, and from the fruitless attempts to reconcile the two.”148 In 
short, Morgenthau was calling for policymakers to see the world as it actually was, as it 
had become, rather than either how they wished it to be, or even how it had been. The 
innovation of nuclear weapons necessitated a re-evaluation of international relations. 
Again, this re-evaluation represented not a shift away from realism but a recognition that 
as times changed so too must the policy stemming from a realist appraisal of the world.  
The presence of nuclear weapons had not only changed the particulars of 
international relations, it had also changed the means by which states would or could do 
business with each other. Based on his experience and judgment, Morgenthau was clear 
that neither superpower wished to use nuclear weapons. Berlin, Korea, Hungary and 
Cuba, for instance, were each examples of the superpowers’ willingness to compromise 
their original positions so as to avoid the threat of nuclear attack on their respective 
homelands. As significant as this withdrawal from the brink was, however, Morgenthau 
drew the readers’ attention to the fact that on several occasions, each power had 
threatened to deploy nuclear weapons, each side in effect hoping to bluff the other into 
believing that it was willing to risk its homeland in pursuit of its objective. Such a 
position, argued Morgenthau, led to a new dimension within international relations and a 
new twist on the realist assumption that a nation state will, in pursuit of its interests, 
employ military force, the effectiveness of which in defeating an enemy or defending 
one’s own nation, lies in its actual application. In the new era of the nuclear age, 
suggested Morgenthau, this was no longer the case. Rather the “primary function of 
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nuclear force lies in making its physical application superfluous by deterring the 
prospective opponent from using it.”149 
Thus as he pre-figured Johnson in his call for the hearts and minds of men, here 
Morgenthau may be said to have pre-figured Mikhail Gorbachev who, in his vision of 
perestroika and glasnost, declared nuclear weapons to be irrational and ineffective tools 
of diplomacy since to use them would be to bring about the destruction of one’s own 
state.150  Likewise, only five years after the first post-war protesters against nuclear 
weapons marched to Aldermaston151 in the United Kingdom, and many years before the 
women of Greenham Common152 would call for the removal of cruise missiles, Hans J. 
Morgenthau, arch-realist, proponent of a realpolitik likely to find favor with Bismarck, 
was calling for a new understanding of international relations in order to take account of, 
and preferably control, nuclear weapons.  
In light of this call, it is perhaps hardly surprising that some have mistaken 
Morgenthau’s views, that some have considered him to have become more liberal with 
age. It is also possible for others to look only at the emphasis placed upon states’ interests 
and see only a conservative, concerned only with the preservation of his own nation state. 
In fact, as we have suggested throughout, Morgenthau is not so easily or neatly classified, 
or at least not if one insists on employing the limiting terminology of left and right. 
Morgenthau, as we have argued form the beginning, is in fact more easily understood as a 
progressive realist. As a realist, he advocated tirelessly for the implementation of a 
foreign policy which would best reflect the interests of the nation state. As a progressive, 
he advocated for causes against the perceived current political interests of his 
government. For Morgenthau there was no inconsistency in his position. His realism, as 
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the very title of his masterpiece suggested, contained within it the recognition that 
relations between states were based on power but also the recognition that nations would 
struggle for peace as well as power. In addition to tracing that struggle in his own work, 
as we have seen here, Morgenthau also charted the struggle through the work of other 
people. It is to those reviews that we now turn.  
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Chapter Five 
Realism Through Other People’s Words:  
Morgenthau’s Book Reviews  
 
 
 
In addition to using academic journals as a venue for his original work, 
Morgenthau, like many scholars, also used journals as a means of commenting upon the 
work of his peers. Through these book reviews Morgenthau was able to participate in the 
general debates of the day, bringing out the thesis of the book under review to be sure, 
but also ensuring that his own views were clearly expressed - whether in support or not of 
the particular book. As one might expect, a study of the reviews written by Morgenthau 
over the course of his career reveals his pre-occupation with the same themes when 
tackled by others, as when written about by himself. Thus, the books he chose to review 
dealt with issues such as idealism, the League of Nations, international law, morality, 
nuclear weapons, and Vietnam. I have selected this particular group of reviews because 
they cover a diverse range of topics and suggested solutions. Read individually, each 
could paint Morgenthau in a either a conservative or liberal hue – some appear quite 
callous with regard to the fate of individuals, some appear quite concerned with those 
same people. In reality, whatever the particular topic, however, and whoever the author, 
Morgenthau’s thought, as it was in his monographs and articles, was constant, reflecting 
Morgenthau’s conviction that much in the field of international relations could be 
mended if only realism was constantly, if flexibly, applied.  
One of Morgenthau’s earliest contributions was to The American Political Science 
Review, the premier journal in the field, and came only a month after the outbreak of war 
in Europe. Morgenthau rejected the argument made by author Georg Cohen in Neo-
Neutrality that neo-neutrality was a positive force in world politics and thus different 
from, and stronger than, traditional neutrality. According to Morgenthau there was no 
community of interests at the international level sufficiently strong to overcome 
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conflicting interests. Thus, just as the ideals of the League of Nations were unattainable, 
so were Cohen’s aspirations for collective security based on an unrealizable international 
solidarity. Morgenthau concluded “…in the realm of politics, it is by definite political, 
and not by abstract humanitarian, considerations that states are moved.”153 With this 
comment Morgenthau pre-figured Politics Among Nations as surely as if he had written 
his own article.  
 A year later, and a year into the European war, Morgenthau again returned to the 
limits of what international law could possibly achieve. Making International Law Work 
argued that law and force were incompatible at the international level. In keeping with his 
later, more developed, arguments, Morgenthau claimed the contrary. Indeed he asserted, 
“there is no such thing as law without force, nor has there ever been organized force 
without law.” Morgenthau rejected the notion that a supranational state would come into 
existence based solely on the aspirations of international law. Rather, he claimed, 
supranational states would come into existence when it suited nation states to concede 
sovereignty. In other words, supranational institutions, as all aspects of international 
relations, would owe their existence to power politics not idealistic hopes. Again 
prefiguring his later work, Morgenthau made clear what he believed to be the foundation 
of international relations: “power politics is not an artificial attribute of our social life; it 
grows out of the very nature of man as a social being.”154 
 Given the centrality of this perception to Morgenthau’s intellectual worldview, it 
is perhaps hardly surprising that he chose to review Georg Schwarzenberger’s Power 
Politics. In his review, he once again rejected the notion that power politics and the rule 
of force were the antitheses of community spirit and the rule of law. From Morgenthau’s 
perspective, quite the opposite was true: it was only through the use of power politics that 
one could hope to achieve community spirit, and only through the threat or use of the rule 
of force that international law could work. With these words, Morgenthau foreshadowed 
the dualism present within Politics Among Nations, and the progressivism and liberatory 
potential within realism. Thus according to Morgenthau’s realist understanding, it was 
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possible to have international community and to live according to, and within limits set 
by, international law. In order to effect such a situation, however, one had to accept that 
states would only act according to their perception of their best interests. Praising 
Schwarzenberger’s work because it would help educate non-specialists who were easily 
dazzled by the “pseudo scientific pretensions of the prophets of permanent peace,” 
Morgenthau also suggested that “…our professional peace planners would do well to 
ponder its lessons.”155 
Morgenthau returned to his vitriolic disdain for liberal idealism in the last full 
year of the war, a time when both policy makers and members of the public were 
thinking about peace. In his review of Towards An Abiding Peace, Morgenthau made 
clear his conviction that that liberalism was an ineffective means of trying to understand 
the world: “…the liberal who, contemptuous of power politics, endeavors to exorcise 
social evils by invoking reason, law, and ethics, will at best remain ineffective in the 
political sphere and at worst fall victim to those evil forces which he may understand but 
which he is unable to meet on their own ground.”156 Again Morgenthau foreshadowed his 
own later political development, making the point that for people who thought as he did, 
“…the antithesis is not between power politics on the one hand, and reason, law, and 
ethics, on the other, but between power politics for evil and power politics for desirable 
objectives.”157 
 For Morgenthau the significance of power politics was not just that it governed 
relations between states, but that it also governed relations within states. This much was 
clear from Morgenthau’s review of Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?, a study of 
the treaties governing the rights and obligations of European minorities mandated by the 
Treaty of Versailles.158 Morgenthau answered the question in the affirmative, suggesting 
that the treaties failed because they regarded the issue of national minorities as a legal 
rather than as a political question. Further complicating the chances of success by 
international treaty was the reality that the minority issue was a question of political 
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import to the larger state within which the given minorities resided, and which was 
therefore unlikely to allow arbitration by an international body.  
 A month before the Allies declared victory in Europe, Morgenthau wrote a review 
of War and Its Causes. Morgenthau rejected the author’s argument that all wars were to 
be equally avoided and that war was always bad. According to Morgenthau, a war of 
defense differed from a war of aggression, and there was a significant difference between 
just and unjust wars.159 Significant to Morgenthau’s later views is that what could here be 
seen as militarism, rejecting those who opposed war, in fact provided the same 
intellectual framework which would later allow Morgenthau to call for an end to the 
Vietnam War. Thus, here again we see that what later appeared to be radical, new views, 
had in fact already been articulated, albeit in a different context, the year World War II 
ended.  
As the United States (and other nations) prepared for the post-war world, 
Morgenthau took it upon himself in book reviews, as he would later do in monographs 
and articles, to articulate what he believed should serve as the parameters of international 
relations in the post-war era. Reviewing Fox’s The Super Powers, and using language 
that would later form the sub-title of his masterpiece, he chided U.S. policymakers for 
refusing to face the political facts of life, the very essence of which was “the struggle for 
power, that is, the desire of individuals or nations to keep the power they have or to add 
to the power they have, or to show the power they have.”160 Clearly Morgenthau praised 
Fox  because his views coincided with Morgenthau’s own. The same was true a few 
months later when he reviewed Manley Hudson’s book International Tribunals. 
Morgenthau applauded Hudson’s recognition of “…the natural limitations of the judicial 
function” and his warning “against regarding it as a universal method for the peaceful 
solution of international disputes.”161 Morgenthau would hardly put it more eloquently 
himself over the course of his career.  
Morgenthau used the occasion of his review of The Device of Government: An 
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Essay on Civil Polity, to establish his view that the proper role of the intellectual was an 
activist, engaged with the problems of the age.162 More poetically, a scholarship devoid 
of contemporary relevance, was for Morgenthau nothing less than medieval scholasticism 
in modern garb. Again, it is against this context that one must place Morgenthau’s later 
anti-war activism. It was not that the Vietnam War sparked a new idea for Morgenthau, it 
was not that he suddenly felt a compulsion to speak out. Rather, what was new about the 
1960s was that so many others felt such a sudden compulsion. Morgenthau had been 
articulating his realism since before the Second World War. For many of those who 
would become activists in the 1960s, it was the Vietnam War which prompted them to 
speak out. Significantly, not all who spoke out did so inspired by a realist assessment of 
international relations but since what they said appeared to coincide with what 
Morgenthau said, it appeared to the superficial observer, as though Morgenthau must be 
inspired by the same ideals as they. In fact, if the point needs to be made again, he was 
not. He was inspired by the same framework as twenty years before: a realist analysis of 
U.S. national interests.   
As the United Nations geared up for its work, Morgenthau used his review of 
Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of Nations to elucidate 
his analysis behind the failure of the League.163 Its officials, argued Morgenthau, had 
erred in perceiving the problems of the day to be capable of solution through technical or 
legal means when in fact they had been political problems that needed to be solved by 
political means. For Morgenthau, the gap between the ideals upon which the League was 
based and the concrete environment in which it was forced to work could not be 
“obliterated” by the “attempt to superimpose a set of abstract principles upon a 
recalcitrant reality.” In 1946, as he would shortly make clear in the first edition of 
Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau was similarly distrustful of the nascent United 
Nations.  
He was equally pessimistic about the potential for change through voluntary 
means within the press. Reviewing A Free and Responsible Press, composed by The 
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Commission on Freedom of the Press, Morgenthau asserted that the main threat to the 
freedom of the press came from monopoly practices.164 Morgenthau perceived a 
similarity with international relations, suggesting that just as it was useless to hope that 
international law could work without teeth, so it would be useless to hope that 
monopolistic “wielders of power” would give up that power of their own volition. Thus 
the government should step in and create “institutional devices which will make it 
impossible…[for]…the abuse of power.” In this as elsewhere, we see the liberatory 
potential within realism, whereby the power of the state could be used to control 
circumstances for the good of all - if one accepts that it would be for the good of all to 
avoid the concentration of media power.  
Proof of the potentially beneficent effects of realism was also evident in 
Morgenthau’s review of Herbert Feiss’ The Spanish Story.165 During World War II Spain 
was dependent on Britain and the United States for oil, just as Germany was dependent 
on Spain for key mineral resources. Morgenthau contrasted the different policies of 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull. 
Churchill used Spain’s dependency upon British oil as a mechanism by which to achieve 
Britain’s larger objective - ensuring that Spanish North Africa and Gibraltar remained out 
of German hands. By contrast, Hull saw Spain’s giving of economic supplies to Hitler as 
a bar to normal relations. Praising Churchill for his realism, and condemning Hull for his 
idealism and moral indignation, Morgenthau argued that it was the realist approach of 
Churchill rather than the idealist perspective of Hull, which had secured the Allies’ larger 
interests.  
As we have seen, Morgenthau credited realism with the ability to win wars, form 
the basis of supranational bodies, and in his review of La Constitution Federale de la 
Suisse, 1848-1948, a centenary commemorative volume of the Swiss confederation of 
1848, with the potential to form the basis of nationhood.166 Morgenthau explored the 
image by which popular understanding of Switzerland was constructed: “…the Swiss 
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constitution of 1848 and the peaceful co-operation of four different nationalities under it 
has become one of the popular arguments in favor of international federation on a 
European, if not a world, scale. The public is treated to the mythological spectacle of a 
Swiss democracy where for more than six centuries segments of the main European 
nations have lived together in peace and freedom.” Against this image, Morgenthau 
posited the blunt assertion that Switzerland as a Federal state was the result, “not of a 
centuries’ old harmony among reasonable and peaceful people, but of a struggle for 
power culminating in a civil war through which one faction of the nation was able to 
impress its will upon the other.” 
Returning to one of the central themes of his life’s work, Morgenthau undertook a 
review of Harold Laski’s Liberty and the Modern State.167 Laski had argued that the Four 
Freedoms of President Roosevelt were a prerequisite to the achievement of liberalism. 
Morgenthau disagreed, contending that the Four Freedoms were insufficient planning 
tools for the post-war world, since they lacked intellectual rigor, were imprecise and were 
as a result, unachievable. This denunciation of what might still be termed New Deal 
politics would appear to place Morgenthau firmly in the conservative camp and would 
certainly appear to place him at odds with his later self and his calls to end poverty. In 
fact, as elsewhere, the distinction is more apparent than real. Morgenthau disliked the 
Four Freedoms because they were an imprecise basis for future policy. They did not take 
account of the situation as it actually was, but rather hoped for how it might become 
without providing the tools necessary to get there. Thus it was not the objective of 
abolishing hunger that Morgenthau rejected but rather the likelihood that the Four 
Freedoms would serve as a means of achieving it. 
As early as the late 1950s, Morgenthau was already questioning the value of 
nuclear weapons, suggesting that their presence necessitated a re-orientation of traditional 
diplomacy based on military strength. Specifically, Morgenthau praised Henry 
Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy for its recognition that peace and war, 
political and military policy were “different phases of one organic whole: the defense and 
promotion of the national interests vis-à-vis other nations.” Yet he doubted Kissinger’s 
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confidence that policymakers could control nuclear weapons as an ordinary part of 
diplomacy and suggested instead that policymakers should restore conventional weapons 
to prominence.  
Morgenthau returned to the Vietnam War in 1966 in his review of Vietnam: A 
Diplomatic Tragedy: The Origins of The United States Involvement. Enlarging upon the 
position he had taken a year earlier in his own monograph, Morgenthau made clear that 
the U.S. was involved in Vietnam not because of bad policies carried out in good faith, 
but because of a series of “untruths, half-truths, and rationalizations.”168 As a result of 
this veil of secrecy, future historians, according to Morgenthau, would have a hard time 
“disentangling the tale” of U.S. engagement. Morgenthau praised the book in particular 
because he believed that it demonstrated that the war was “rooted in the philosophy and 
diplomacy of Dulles.” Personalizing his criticisms yet further, Morgenthau highlighted 
the fact that when first advanced, Dulles’ policy had been opposed by the then Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson. A decade or so later, however, Johnson was apparently “compelled 
to draw the ultimate logical conclusions” from “that very same policy.” Thus again we 
see Morgenthau’s activism against the Vietnam War, and his denunciation of those 
individuals he believed to have instituted the wrong policy, in the context of his 
perception of what constituted the real interests of the United States.  
In a similar vein, Morgenthau, as he would do more fully elsewhere, articulated 
his views upon the issue of foreign aid in his review of The Cultural Approach: Another 
Way in International Relations.169 Emphasizing what he perceived to the errors in current 
thinking about aid, Morgenthau somewhat bluntly asserted that “the concept of a foreign 
office sitting in a political vacuum and spreading goodwill and understanding throughout 
the world for the love of it has no relation to the actualities of international politics.” 
Rather, he argued, cultural instruments such as foreign aid should be used by states only 
in pursuit of their national interests. Published in The New York Times in the 1960s, 
Morgenthau’s arguments about the potential uses of foreign aid would certainly appear to 
label him as a conservative. By contrast, his stance on China would suggest the opposite. 
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Reviewing China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A, Morgenthau argued that 
the current China policy of the United States was in error.170 Specifically, Morgenthau 
called for the removal of the seventh fleet, the presence of which was surely a 
provocation to China, as a means of avoiding a regional conflict, and for a re-orientation 
of policy toward China in general. 
Morgenthau’s book reviews touched on a wide variety of subjects, but at the root 
of all was his twin belief that as a framework for international relations, idealism should 
be replaced by realism. This fundamental position, which remained constant throughout 
his career, led him to reject international concern for minorities within foreign nations, 
indiscriminate aid to foreign countries based on notions of charity, and collective security 
arrangements based on presumed faith and goodwill. Each of these positions would 
generally fall within what could be termed the politics of conservatism. The same realist 
framework, however, led Morgenthau to call for withdrawal from Vietnam, recognition 
of China, establishment of collective security based on the will of nation states, and the 
abandonment of nuclear weapons if not absolutely at least to international control willed 
by, and recognized by, nation states. Each of these positions would generally fall within 
what might be termed the politics of liberalism. This duality of political perspectives 
suggests a level of confusion within Morgenthau’s thinking. In fact, there is no confusion, 
only two sides of a single coin. Such was the beauty of Morgenthau’s realism. It, being 
constant and containing within it both conservative and progressive elements, could be 
applied to a variety of different situations, which might, because of their different natures, 
result in a variety of implications, a variety sufficient as to suggest conflicting positions 
within Morgenthau’s thinking. In fact, while the suggested policy choices might differ, 
the fundamental analytical basis remained the same. Thus Morgenthau, recognizing his 
own consistency, and believing firmly in the obligations of the intellectual to engage with 
the problems of the day, believed himself to be compelled to honor the implications of his 
beliefs, whatever the public and political consequences of so doing. Thus in both his calls 
for withdrawal from Vietnam, and his rejection of foreign aid as a charitable endeavor,  
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Morgenthau was acting according to the same political impulse: advocacy of the policy 
which would best serve the interests of the United States.  
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Conclusion 
Toward A New Paradigm? 
 
 
 
Hans Morgenthau came to the United States in 1937 as a refugee from European 
fascism. He did so carrying the burden of his experience both as a man excluded from his 
native country because of the significance attached by one particular political party to his 
ascribed ethnicity, and as a European who had watched that same political party build up 
sufficient military strength so as to pose a threat to the rest of the continent. This 
experience of rejection engendered within Morgenthau an abhorrence both for 
totalitarianism and the weak methods of understanding relations between states on which 
he perceived the international system to have relied.  
In addition to these burdens of rejection and disillusionment, however, 
Morgenthau also arrived bearing the advantages of one who had attended university and 
acquired a comprehensive understanding of political relations. Putting the burdens and 
the advantages together, it should come as no surprise that upon his entry into the U.S. 
intellectual academy, he should have advocated an understanding of international 
relations which contained within it both the potential to be aggressively robust where 
needs be - in order to prevent, for example, the take over of Europe by totalitarianism, 
whether German fascism or Soviet communism - but also the potential to be liberatory 
and inclusive where needs be - resolve issues pertaining to domestic ills, withdraw from 
fights of fancy - in order to preserve the state and promote the greater good of the society 
empowered by the state. It should also come as no surprise that as a member of that 
intellectual academy, Morgenthau perceived himself to have a responsibility as a scholar, 
teacher and public intellectual to convince others of the righteousness of his beliefs, and 
thereby work toward the advancement of both the state and society in which he now 
lived. 
Specifically, Morgenthau published monographs, articles, book reviews; delivered 
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speeches, taught consistently, both at his ‘home’ university and at various guest 
institutions, and was a regular participant in popular analyses of current events. In so 
doing, particularly at the start of his career, he helped produce much of the intellectual 
underpinnings of the strategic posture of the United States during the early Cold War. 
Politics Among Nations, and the teaching that helped produce it, and later resulted from 
it, helped shape the worldview of a generation of scholars and policymakers. They 
believed Morgenthau when Morgenthau told them that relations between states were 
determined above all else by the pursuit of each state for power and security. They 
believed Morgenthau when he asserted that supranational bodies in an age of nation 
states were unlikely to be able to do very much. They believed Morgenthau when he 
proposed that states, being states, will defend their interests up to and including the use of 
military force. Morgenthau propounded, his students and others influenced by his words 
implemented.  
Over the course of Morgenthau’s career, he continued to propound, and others 
continued to implement. As the years passed, however, a discrepancy grew up between 
what Morgenthau was propounding and what others were implementing. Superficially, or 
so it appeared to many at the time, it appeared as though the discrepancy was the fault of 
Morgenthau. As one who had apparently shifted from arguing the need to contain the 
communism of the Soviet Union to advocating the need to accept the communism of 
North Vietnam, he had apparently shifted his political position. Indeed, it would be 
logical to assume that having made such a journey in his political outlook, from 
conservative to radical, Morgenthau would have made a similar journey in terms of his 
theoretical perspective. Morgenthau seemed to suggest as much when he chose to serve 
as a political advisor to Eugene McCarthy, the most liberal of the candidates in the 1968 
Democratic primary race, and again when he chose to serve as a board member for the 
Institute for Policy Research, the left-wing ‘think-tank’ and bete noir of the American 
right.171 Morgenthau’s perception of himself as the philosopher speaking truth to power - 
that he must honor his convictions with actions and words - made him an uncomfortable 
bedfellow for some of his original political associates. As a result, seeing his apparent 
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shift and listening to his real criticisms, some policymakers condemned him for his 
treachery and his weakness. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, however, Morgenthau, despite all appearances to 
the contrary, made no such shift. Certainly what he said in 1968 involved implementing 
policies different to those inspired by what he said in 1948, but the difference was in the 
policy not the theory. Thus Morgenthau in 1948 called for a robust containment of the 
Soviet Union ere it become too aggressive and seek to expand across the continent or 
even world. Morgenthau perceived that such an expansion would be against the interests 
of the United States. And, just as importantly, he perceived that the United States, could 
by making its position clear from early on, succeed in its objective and contain the 
communism of the Soviet Union within the Soviet Union.  
In 1968 Morgenthau called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam 
because he did not believe that it was in the interests of the United States to continue to 
involve itself in the region. Furthermore, and just as importantly, he did not perceive that 
the United States could succeed in its objective of preventing the spread of communism 
from one part of what Morgenthau considered to be a single country (even if current U.S. 
policymakers failed to recognize this) to the other. In both cases, however, Morgenthau 
was proposing that U.S. policy makers should base their course of action upon the real 
interests of the United States. In short, he was arguing for a realist interpretation of 
international relations.  
It is perhaps not surprising that so many of Morgenthau’s contemporaries failed to 
recognize the consistency contained within his arguments and so accused him of 
changing his political tune. Perceived to be the doctrine which provided the basis for the 
containment of communism, realism was perhaps inevitably perceived to be a 
conservative doctrine. And so it was in its opposition to the unchecked spread of Soviet 
communism. What was not so obvious in the early years of Morgenthau’s career was the 
variety of potential policies which could all be justified on the basis of realism. They 
were not so obvious because the progressive element contained within the very theory of 
realism, was not so obvious. As we have seen through an analysis of Morgenthau’s 
published works, it was there - right from the beginning - but again perhaps 
understandably, in the 1940s and 1950s, at the height of the Cold War hysteria, others 
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saw, and responded to, what they expected to see.  
As a result, they did not see the theory for all that it was. Morgenthau did see it. 
Realism, for Morgenthau, never ceased to be about anything but the security interests of 
the nation state, but those interests, according to Morgenthau encompassed far more than 
a simple amassing of military strength designed to secure position vis-à-vis other states. 
They involved the resolution of domestic divisions in order to promote unity and well-
being, and they included a recognition of what the state could and could not achieve vis-
à-vis other states - the recognition that a “crusading frenzy” for the wrong ends could not 
but be detrimental to the state. Thus realism was, for Morgenthau, both conservative and 
progressive. 
In taking this different starting point, this thesis offers a challenge to 
contemporary realists. The security problem of states, in the form of neoclassical realism 
is still one of the most important aspects of contemporary International Relations theory 
today. Even as other approaches such as democratic peace theory or constructivism gain 
strength, so realism remains a consistent element within IR theory. As it does so, 
however, it is perceived to be an innately conservative framework and thus one with little 
to offer the more progressive approaches. This thesis suggests otherwise.  
An analysis of Morgenthau’s life and work has demonstrated the progressive 
potential within his realist framework. This thesis suggests that that progressive element 
provides a starting point for the establishment of common ground between classical 
realism or even neo-realism and more obviously left-wing frameworks such as 
democratic peace theory. Morgenthau’s understanding of his realism in the concrete 
political reality of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrates that classical realism may be as 
usefully applied to a liberal or progressive vision as to the more traditional conservative 
vision. Thus with this thesis, we seek to commence a process of the reclamation of the 
‘left-wing’ potential of realism. 
Within the context of “real-world” United Sates politics Morgenthau went as left 
as he could: as a critic of the Vietnam War and the Johnson administration, as a member 
and writer for Americans for Democratic Action, as a supporter of the Institute for Policy 
Studies, and as an advisor to Eugene McCarthy. In each of these endeavors Morgenthau 
employed his realism to support liberatory and progressive ends. In using his world view 
 81
to critique the development of the trajectories of domination, control and imperialism of 
the post-war United States Morgenthau offered a remarkable demonstration of the power 
and flexibility of realism.  
It is the contention of this thesis that any contemporary realist might do the same. 
Thus it is the challenge of this thesis to invite contemporary realist thinkers to explore, 
recover and reclaim the liberatory and progressive potential of classical realism. The 
concerns raised by Morgenthau about the global environment, racism, poverty, 
militarism, inequality and the rising power of large trans-national corporations are all 
issues with which many contemporary realists are concerned today. Morgenthau 
predicated and analyzed these issues in terms of the classical realism he had done so 
much to revive, reinvigorate, articulate and popularize in his time at the University of 
Chicago. It is for contemporary realists to now do the same.  
Illustrating what has previously been accomplished within the framework of 
classical realism creates the potential for two new research programs. First, reclaiming 
the liberatory potential of realism provides for the creation of a new understanding of 
contemporary realism which can transcend both the internal debates between classic and 
neoclassical realism and those between classical realism, neo-realism and new classical 
realism. Second, foregrounding the liberatory possibilities of classical realism offers a 
fruitful approach for the recreation of common ground between realism and other more 
‘politically progressive’ paradigms in contemporary international relations theory.  
Accepting the liberatory possibilities within realism, and the subsequent potential 
for engagement with other approaches in the field, such as peace research or 
constructivism suggests a possible path for the reintegration of the whole discipline of 
international relations. For while considered separately each theory within International 
Relations might suggest a particular number of policy solutions, it is possible that when 
considered together, the collective result might be the production of a great many more, 
and more original policy solutions for any number of contemporary problems. It is thus 
the somewhat immodest hope of this thesis that in exploring the constancy combined 
with flexibility that lay at the root of Hans J. Morgenthau’s realist understanding, it has 
gone some way toward the laying of the ground work for an innovative liberatory-based 
general theory of international politics for the twenty-first century. 
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